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Abstract
Monitoring and Improving Managed Security Services inside a
Security Operation Center
Mina Khalili
Nowadays, small to medium sized companies, which usually cannot afford hiring ded-
icated security experts, are interested in benefiting from Managed Security Services
(MSS) provided by third party Security Operation Centers (SOC) to tackle network-
wide threats. Accordingly, the performance of the SOC is becoming more and more
important to the service providers in order to optimize their resources and compete
in the global market. Security specialists in a SOC, called analysts, have an impor-
tant role to analyze suspicious machine-generated alerts to see whether they are real
attacks. How to monitor and improve the performance of analysts inside a SOC is
a critical issue that most service providers need to address. In this paper, by ob-
serving workflows of a real-world SOC, a tool consisting of three different modules
is designed for monitoring analysts’ activities, analysis performance measurement,
and performing simulation scenarios. The tool empowers managers to evaluate the
SOC’s performance which helps them to conform to Service-Level Agreement (SLA)
regarding required response time to security incidents, and see the need for improve-
ment. Moreover, the designed tool is strengthened by a background service module
to provide feedback about anomalies or informative issues for security analysts in the
SOC. Three case studies have been conducted based on real data collected from the
operational SOC, and simulation results have demonstrated the effectiveness of the
different modules of the designed tool in improving the SOC performance.
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Advantages of employing Managed Security Services (MSS), such as cost effective-
ness, skilled security experts, appropriate facilities, up to date security awareness,
and 24 hours continuous service encourage different companies to outsource their se-
curity services rather than having in-house security employees [1]. Network security
monitoring (NSM) was born as a different term to specify the new feature of MSS
for continuous monitoring of networks by human experts rather than just installing
security appliances. NSM is defined by Bejtlich [2] as “the collection, analysis, and
escalation of indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions.” De-
scribing the Bejtlich’s definition, in order to provide NSM service, Managed Security
Service Providers (MSSP) deploy various sensors in the client site, such as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) to gather various suspicious alerts from each client’s com-
puter network, and send them to the Security Operation Center (SOC). Then, SOC
as a heart of NSM correlates and analyzes the alerts by its human security analysts
to confirm whether they are successful exploits. A security incident is detected and
confirmed by True Positive (TP) alerts as indications. In case of an incident, results
of analysis need to be exposed to decision makers, in a process called escalation, to
react in an appropriate way.
Emerging demand of outsourcing security services from different companies makes
the business world increasingly competitive for MSS providers. Monitoring and im-
proving performance of the SOC becomes more crucial to the managers to optimize
their resources and improve the quality of service. Challenges faced by the opera-
tional SOC include: 1. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any model
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for the SOC analysis workflow to elaborate analysts’ detailed tasks. By modeling
the analysis workflow, we can obtain a clear picture about analysis steps allowing
the system to track analysts’ activities. 2. There do not exist automated tools for
monitoring and evaluating SOC performance. Consequently, there is no clear under-
standing of SOC capability and different analysts’ performance. 3. There does not
exist any tool to simulate potential improvement options of the SOC in order to assess
their effectiveness. 4. There does not exist any tool to support convenient knowledge
transfer among analysts. Analysts usually possess different knowledge, since they
gain different knowledge during each investigation related to different clients. The
above mentioned challenges prevent managers to prioritize the effort on improving
SOC performance.
There are three main categories of related work (a more detailed review is given
in Chapter 6). The first domain discusses different aspects of MSS. There are some
works ([3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]) proposing different designs for a SOC architecture, such
as employing recognition mechanism of immune system, cloud based NSM, hierarchi-
cal mobile-agent-based approaches, etc. Some papers ([10] [11] [12]) study various
aspects of different operational SOCs to compare their functionality. These works are
different from our work, since we neither modify the SOC architecture, nor provide a
classification framework for SOCs. The second domain is alert correlation techniques
helping to provide more accurate alerts, and reducing the rate of False Positive (FP)
([13][14][15][16]). The third domain reviews studies about Call Centers (CC), since
SOC and CC are similar regarding their performance evaluation. In a CC, operators
answer to different calls in a queue where in a SOC, analysts analyze incoming logs in
a queue. Different queueing models are employed in this area to solve the problem of
staffing, scheduling, and routing jobs policy ([17][18][19][20]). Overview of the litera-
ture shows there is little work related to performance measurement and improvement
of a SOC.
The designed system consists of a Graphical User Interface (GUI) for managers
with three modules; monitoring, measuring, and simulation, respectively. Moreover,
it consists of a background service to generate feedbacks to SOC’s analysts about
anomalies and informative issues. The tool helps managers to be updated about
current analysts’ activities of the SOC with the monitoring module. This module
illustrates details of recent investigations which are in progress or recently completed
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by the analysts. Managers can check overall and detailed SOC performance with the
measuring module. Consequently, they may see the need for adding new analysts, rec-
ognize demanding clients, or optimize certain analysis steps average duration. With
the simulation module, they can assess different performance improvement options
to see the potential effect of each possible improvement on the performance result
of real production data, without affecting the normal operation of the SOC. Two
improvement options can be automating certain steps to increase the efficiency of
human analysts’ tasks or the way of dispatching incoming alerts among analysts.
Analysts benefit from the feedback module where they get hints about next probable
steps, and feedback whether they have performed their tasks in normal range of time
or they have missed a step. Moreover, they can learn from the results of previous
analyses performed by other analysts. The development team of the operational SOC
can improve the SOC Console application based on provided evidence by the sim-
ulation module. Furthermore, some measuring results can be used as evidence to
demonstrate quality of services to the clients.
Contributions of our work are; 1. modeling the alert analysis workflow based
on a real operational SOC, 2. developing a practical tool capable of; a) monitoring
analysts’ analysis workflow, b) measuring analysts’ performance by defining different
performance metrics, c) providing simulation opportunities to assess possible improve-
ment options. d) enabling knowledge transfer among analysts by feedback module, 3.
conducting three case studies based on real life activity logs of analysts over a period
of 57 days to show how the performance would be affected by different simulation
scenarios.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the required
background knowledge to understand this work. Chapter 3 illustrates our modeling
methodology of the analysis workflow, and the logging phase of analysts’ activities.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the system’s functionality, and the modules em-
ployed methodology and implementation. Chapter 5 evaluates three case studies to
assess different improvement options of the SOC performance. Chapter 6 reviews




In this chapter, the operational SOC workflow and its related characteristics and
notations are explained to provide background knowledge. Besides illustrating SOC
characteristics, a brief description of the designed system, and related definitions are
given to show how the proposed system functions alongside the SOC main workflow.
A conceptual example of a typical service deployment model is drawn in Figure 1
from an infrastructure perspective (in reality, a client deployment architecture can
be more complex). The operational SOC uses Virtual Private Network (VPN) to
connect the client site to the SOC. Depending on the number of sensors, sensors can
be placed at different locations in the client network, such as outside the firewall
facing internet, behind the firewall inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ), which are
accessible internal points of client’s network from outside, or in the local network
behind the firewall.
Different devices and sensors, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), asset
detection tools, and flow analysis tools can be deployed to gather various suspicious
events, called alerts1. Once sensors are deployed on the client site, they start gener-
ating alerts, based on their configurations, and sending them to the SOC via VPN.
In the SOC, analysts receive the alerts of each client in real time. Alerts (suspicious
events) should be analyzed within a specific time period which is defined in Service
Level Agreement (SLA) signed between MSS provider and the client. For instance,
response time of the operational SOC studied in this work is two hours defined in
1To clarify notations, alerts are specifically IDS-generated. However the event notation includes
all kinds of machine generated alerts and logs. Logs could be referred to normal operating system
events (e.g., unsuccessful attempt to login a system) that can be useful for a security investigation.
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Figure 1: An example of a typical deployment model for Network Security Monitoring
service representing an operational SOC and a client infrastructure
their SLA.
Analysts rely on the main tool of the SOC, named SOC Console, to review related
alerts of each client and conduct analysis. The workflow of alert analysis starts from
the SOC Console consisting tasks, such as receiving alerts, cross referencing network
map of a client, examining a client’s assets and vulnerabilities, opening content of the
alert packet, and contacting the client in case of a true positive alert.
The analysis task of sensor-generated alerts by an analyst is called investigation
(investigation and analysis notations can be used interchangeably). If the result of
an alert analysis is true positive indicating a real threat, it is called an incident. The
analyst needs to inform the related client about the incident in order to perform a
proper action to tackle it. Such a process of informing client is called escalation. Based
on severity of a threat and client’s preference, different approaches could be defined
for informing the client about different types of incident in the SLA, documented in
an escalation grid file. Escalation approaches include sending an email, calling the
administrator, or informing the client in a monthly report.
Investigations conclude in one of the following three different results, a) creating
a new incident when a new threat is detected, b) updating a current incident when
either more indications (TP alerts) related to one recorded incident are on hands and
need to be added to the same incident, or the incident needs to be updated after
contacting the client, or c) closing and archiving the alert, since there is no enough
indication to declare the alert as a threat. From now on, investigation class points
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at one of the mentioned investigation result categories.
Moreover, investigations can be categorized based on their alert types. An in-
vestigation type implies an analysis related to a specific attack type, e.g., malware
infection. Different alerts related to a same attack type are grouped together to rep-
resent an attack type e.g., different snort rule IDs indicating the malware infection.
There are eight investigation types in two main categories from the SOC per-
spective, security-related incidents and policy violation incidents. Investigation types
inherit their names from attack types, and can be used interchangeably, as they are
implying the same concept. Table 1 represents different investigation types. Table 2
describes attack definitions related to investigation types. And, Table 3 provides one
EventID example for each investigation type.
Incident category Investigation type Abbreviation
Security related BruteForce Attack BFA
Denial Of Service DOS




Policy violation Policy Violation PV
Peer to Peer Bittorrent P2P
Table 1: List of investigation types related to the incident categories
Inside an investigation workflow, each investigation has some major steps. As is
discussed, an investigation process is conducted through the SOC Console. Generally,
for analyzing each alert, 1. analysts expand details of the alert (step A). 2. Then, they
may check network assets to see whether the reported alert is related to discovered
vulnerabilities (step C). 3. They also check whether a similar incident with the
same alert type is recently recorded (step C). 4. Some investigations might need
more in-depth analysis, such as exporting alert packet content and using specific
tools (e.g., Wireshark) to analyze them (step O). 5. In the end, if they infer the
alert is not a threat based on the current situation, they will close and archive the
alert (step B). If they deduce the alert is true positive, then they need to record
and escalate the incident to the related client. 6. If the similar incident is still in
6
Investigation type Description
Brute Force Attack It is a probabilistic approach to obtain username and
password credentials by trying all possible keys [21].
Denial of Service It implies flooding resources by many requests making
them out of service [22].
External Vulnerability Scan It is a legitimate service for evaluating vulnerabili-
ties of the network which can be threatful while it is
launching from unauthorized sources [23].
Malware Infection indicates all kinds of malicious activities resulting in
exploiting network assets [24].
Abnormal Activities Four categories of Snort alerts [25]; miscellaneous ac-
tivity, miscellaneous attack, access to vulnerable web
applications, and detection of TCP connection in the
client’s netwrok are grouped together forming this cat-
egory.
OTHERS Alerts that do not fit in any mentioned attack types
are placed under this category.
Policy Violation This category is considered for both adult content ac-
cess and chatting applications which can be illegal
based on the client’s policy.
Peer to Peer Bittorrent It is a legitimate file sharing protocol which can be
defined as a policy violation activity inside a client
network.
Table 2: Investigation types and related descriptions
the process, they update the current incident with more indications (step D). 7. If
there is no recent similar incident, they record it as a new incident (step E). 8. Since
recording an incident in the system is accompanied by escalating the incident, analysts
may check the required escalation method from escalation grid document (step F).
Each mentioned task is considered as one step of an investigation which the analyst
performs to accomplish the alert analysis workflow. Table 4 describes different steps.
For each investigation type, there are usually several possible investigation ap-
proaches. We collect all possible analysis approaches in one integrated model consist-
ing of different investigation paths of all investigation types. The complete investiga-
tion workflow modeling phase will be described in details in Section 3.1.
A simple flowchart is drawn as an “model example” in Figure 2. Three end nodes
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Investigation EventID EventID description
type example
BFA 31304 “SERVER-WEBAPP PocketPAD brute-force login
attempt” [26]
DOS 2522 “This event is generated when an attempt is made to
exploit a known vulnerability in the Microsoft imple-
mentation of SSL Version 3.” [27]
EVS 632 “This event is generated when an external user scans
an internal SMTP server using Network Associates’
Cybercop vulnerability scanner.” [28]
MI 35462 “MALWARE-CNC Win.Trojan.Kazy outbound con-
nection” [29]
AA 18180 “This event is generated when an attempt is made to
exploit a known vulnerability in flash player.” [30]
OTHERS 101010 “A customized rule for the sensors to verify DNS
queries by comparing to a blacklist file.”
PV 34463 “APP-DETECT TeamViewer remote administration
tool outbound connection attempt” [31]
P2P 12426 “This event is generated when network traffic that in-
dicates Ruckus P2P broadcast domain probe is being
used.” [32]
Table 3: An EventID example for each investigation type category
show the three possible investigation results (classes). Each directed path from the
start node to the end node is one possible investigation path. As is shown, two
investigation paths result in scenario#1 which is closing and archiving the alert. The
shorter path indicates that the analyst only by expanding the alert detail in the SOC
Console determines that the alert is false positive. The other path shows the decision
is made after conducting more analysis steps, such as step O which is about deep
alert packet content analysis. The other scenarios#2 and 3 represent two possible
investigation paths resulting in updating an incident and creating a new incident
respectively.
Steps consist of sub-steps called actions. Actions are minor tasks grouped into
one step. Actions are track-able points for each step performed by analysts. They
correspond to single mouse click on the SOC console listed in Table 5, such as clicking
on a specific button, or opening a window. Series of mouse clicks (actions) represent
8
StepIDs Description
A Checking global view of the SOC Console which shows all alerts
related to each client, expanding a specific alert to check the
details and related destination and source IP addresses
B Classifying an event as not-suspicious and labeling it as FP
C Checking the network assets to see whether the reported alert
is related to discovered vulnerabilities. Moreover, checking
whether the same attack is reported recently
D Updating an existing incident for the client, since a similar inci-
dent is reported recently. Or updating the incident description,
since the client responded to the incident (clarifying the incident)
E Creating a new incident for the client, since indications confirm
the alert as suspicious (true positive alert)
F Checking the escalation grid for the related client. In this grid,
analysts are provided information about how the client prefers
to be informed about different kinds of attacks depends on crit-
icality (e.g. call, email, report)
O Opening the alert packet content by a specific tool to analyze
deeply, such as Wireshark.
Table 4: Step IDs and their description
a task (step) which is performed. To avoid discussing unnecessary details, we focus
on steps rather than actions mostly throughout the paper.
The pre-condition of the proposed system to monitor, measure, simulate, and feed-
back the investigation workflow is to find a way to track and log analysts’ activities on
the SOC Console. Logging activities becomes possible by defining steps and actions.
As is discussed, actions are series of mouse clicks on the SOC Console. A script is
written to log SOC Console activities with different required attributes which will be
discussed in details in Section 3.2.
The designed system runs at different locations of the infrastructure, as it assists
both managers and analysts. Referencing back to Figure 1, three locations of the
SOC are labeled in that figure which are involved by the proposed system. Label
I indicates the location at the server room where the tool for auditing and logging
analysts’ activities is running continuously keeping the logs up to date. Label II is
the manager’s desktop where the user interface (UI) with three modules (monitoring,




A 130 Opening a specific client alert view
105 Expanding the aggregated alert detail
107 Clicking on the alerts to view alert details by “Editor”
B 109 Clicking on the button “Acknowledge” from alert detail
125 Clicking on the button “Acknowledge” from alert list
C 104 Clicking on “View Asset” that will open a small window from
source IP
126 Clicking on “View Asset” that will open a small window from
destination IP
110 Clicking on the tab “Incidents”
112 Clicking on “Edit incident” to open and view the incident
D 114 Clicking on the button “Add to incident”
116 Clicking on the button “Add alerts to incident”
117 Under comment box, clicking on the button “Apply” or “OK”
E 119 Clicking on the button ”Create incident”
121 Clicking the button ”Finish”
F 122 Opening the documents dashboard
123 Selecting the client
124 click on the document ”Escalation Grid”
O 103 clicking on the button ”Export to pcap”
127 Opening the packet using Wireshark
Table 5: Steps with sub-steps as Action IDs and related description
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Chapter 3
Modeling and Logging the
Investigation Workflow
In this chapter, the modeling phase of the investigation workflow is discussed. Then,
the logging phase of analysts’ activities will be detailed.
3.1 Modeling the Investigation Workflow
Before going through the modeling details, Section 3.1.1 justifies the employed method,
UML activity diagram, than another popular modeling method, petri net, to model
the investigation workflow.
3.1.1 UML Activity Diagram vs. Petri Net
There are two popular workflow modeling methods, petri net [33] and Unified Model-
ing Language (UML) activity diagram [34], in the literature. In this section, they are
reviewed for modeling SOC’s workflows. Both petri net and activity diagram meth-
ods intend to model workflow systems (WFS) with ordered and parallel activities
considering decisions and iterations in a graphical representation.
Petri net is a bipirate graph for modeling systems’ workflows graphically. It is
enriched with precise mathematical definitions. It consists of places, transitions, and
arcs which are circles, vertical boxes, and directed arrows respectively. A simple
schema is provided in figure 3. Places represent conditions; transitions imply events
which may occur; and arcs are connectors of places and transitions. A transition could
12

in contact with the related client (environment) to clarify certain situations. Actions
take time to be completed in the SOC, which basic petri net does not support. In
our work, we need to model sequence of possible actions without detailing pre or post
conditions.
The discussed issues and comparisons between petri net and activity diagram lead
us to choose UML activity diagrams to model SOC’s workflows. Activity diagram
notations are concise, enough, and easy to understand for our need, where each
node of a diagram represents an action either from the system or environment beside
considering probable duration to perform the action.
3.1.2 Modeling Methodology
In this section, the modeling methodology of the investigation workflow is detailed.
Hofstede [44] defines a workflow as an executable process, a detailed description of
tasks with their chronological dependencies.
Modeling the investigation workflow for the designed system is a precondition to
develop different functionalities of the system. Through the modeling phase, a good
understanding of the investigation workflow is achieved. Consequently, measurable
details which can be monitored and logged are identified as steps and actions discussed
in Section 2.
The modeling of the investigation workflow is performed in two phases. The first
phase is to gather the expert knowledge from analysts to identify different investiga-
tion types and relevant approaches. By completing this phase, Tables 1, 4, and 5 are
provided in Section 2 to describe investigation types, and relevant steps and actions.
To model different tasks (steps) and their relationship, UML activity diagram has
been employed to visualize the model. The second phase is to visualize the model for
the designed tool. Graphviz V.2.38 [45] is employed to layout the activity diagram
to represent the investigation workflow model in the system.
Different analysis approaches regarding all investigation types are modeled in one
integrated model by an activity diagram. Initially, it was assumed different investi-
gation types have different analysis approaches. We had eight distinct investigation
models. Later by comparing them, it became clear, however related approaches of
different investigation types vary slightly, they can be integrated into one general
model regardless of the investigation types. Slight difference, for instance having one
14
step more or less, can be managed within the same model. We aggregate all possible
paths into one integrated model in which they do not contradict each other but just
make the model bigger covering different investigation types paths.
The integrated model is shown in Figure 4. A labeling system is used to address
each node of the activity diagram, than the node description. Each node of activity
diagram is the representation of one single action belonging to a step. In other words,
the label of each node indicates the node belongs to which action and step.
As is explained in Section 2, steps are tasks labeled by alphabet characters (step
ID), and actions as single mouse clicks are labeled by numbers (action ID). The
combination of step ID, and action ID is the identifier of each node of the activity
diagram in the format of ‘step ID : action ID’. For instance, we label the node of
activity diagram as A:107 implying the related action 107 belonging to step A. Related
description of different steps and actions are provided in Tables 4, and 5 in Section 2.
A sequence of nodes following from first node to the last node of the model forms
an investigation path. One example of the investigation path is Specified by double
boxes in Figure 4.
The logical relationship among different nodes of the model could be AND or OR.
By traversing a single investigation path in the model, all existing nodes in the path
have AND logical relationship from the start to the end node. When it is OR, it
implies possibility of different investigation paths. By facing diamond shapes, which
are decision nodes of the model, we can see OR relation among different nodes repre-
senting different investigation paths. The different investigation paths can be followed
based on different conditions, such as different investigation types, or previous node’s
results. Following a single path of the investigation model, there is an AND logical
relationship among the all related nodes. AND logical relation implies mandatory
nodes. If an analyst misses one mandatory node between previous and next node of
the path, the feedback module will warn the analyst about missing step. It will be
discussed in details in Sections 4.1.4, and 4.2.4.
It is important to have a unique actionable label (stepID:actionID) for each node
of the model since incoming analysts’ activity logs will be mapped to each related
node of the model.
The tool determines an investigation is completed if the next node of the current
node is End node. Since we have several nodes in the model which could be considered
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Figure 4: The investigation model
as the last node, we connect all of them to one dummy node called End. The tool by
traversing next node of current node, can find out whether the next node is the End
node. If so, then the current node is the last log of the investigation.
Graphviz [45] is employed to generate the investigation model as the graph output
in a DOT file format. The DOT file can be fed into the system and traversed in
order to track analysts’ activities by comparing incoming logs with the related model.
NetworkX package [46] in python is used as the data structure to read the DOT file.
Since preparing activity diagrams by the Graphviz tool requires writing codes in
a special format, which is not user-friendly for the analysts, we introduce an open
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source extension for Microsoft Visio called GraphVisio [47]. This extension eases the
phase of generating a DOT file where analysts draw activity diagrams with Visio and
then export their model directly to a DOT file.
3.2 Logging Analysts’ Activities
Based on the extracted model from Section 3.1.2, the investigation workflow is defined
by different steps (tasks) and their dependencies. Each task is defined by different
actions as single mouse clicks on the SOC Console. These mouse clicks are logged
by a python code which is part of the system. Each log represents one single action
performed by an analyst through the SOC Console.
Each row of logs consists of eleven attributes. Attributes are listed and described
in Table 6. Each log contains information about start and end time of the action
as two attributes: TimeStart, and TimeEnd. We have three other attributes as In-
vestigationTypeID, StepID, and ActionID. The SourceID represents the alert is from
which source (e.g., IDS), and the EventID represents Snort signatures or customized
sensor rules. The AnalystID shows which analyst is performing the investigation,
where the ClientID shows the related client. The IncidentID represents whether pre-
viously related client had the same type of incident. The InvID is the identifier of the
ongoing investigation, a unique ID for all related investigation logs in the database.
Database Attributes Description
ID Auto increment primary key of the table
TimeStart Starting time of the action
TimeEnd Ending time of the action
InvestigationTypeID Related investigation type
StepID Related step
ActionID Related action
SourceID Event (alert) comes from which source e.g., IDS
EventID The rule identifier of sensors to raise the alert
AnalystID Which analyst performs the investigation
ClientID Investigation is related to which client
IncidentID If currently the incident is recorded in the SOC Console
InvID One unique ID assigned to all logs of the investigation
Table 6: Related attributes and description
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Based on the identified actions through the SOC Console, the logging script logs
the actions started and ended via the SOC Console. Start time of actions are bound
to the specific buttons, and end time of actions are bound to the start time of the next
recognizable action by the tool. In this way, no time in the middle of an investigation
is skipped in case of using other tools not being monitored by our logging system.
End time of the last action is a specific button to close an investigation.
The output of the logging tool is a text file which needs to be adjusted by pre-
processing phase (will be detailed in Section 5.1) to fit into the table of database.
As is shown in Table 6, each row of activity logs has related StepID and Ac-
tionID which the row will be matched to the investigation model. As is discussed in
Section 3.1.2, we have the same identifier for each node of the model (StepID and
ActionID). Therefore, by having StepID:ActionID from the log, we can examine the
model to see which node can be mapped to the log. In this way, by tracking analysts
activities the system is able to understand what is going on in each investigation,
such as analyst is working on which step currently, or what is the next action. By
mapping all logs of one investigation to the investigation model, the tool can also
identify which actions are missed from the followed investigation path.
During the first phase of our implementation, due to lack of real-life activity logs,
a program is developed to generate random log entries simulating different investi-
gations by multiple analysts, for different investigation types, decisions (paths), and
clients. By traversing the investigation model, different random paths are gener-
ated with random arrival times. The program could simultaneously generate events
for multiple analysts performing investigations in parallel for multiple clients, and
store generated logs in the database as well. On the other hand, the tool queries
the database incrementally after configurable time intervals and updates results in
measuring and monitoring modules.
In this phase, we made an assumption about identifying each single investiga-
tion log, that the combination of following six attributes forms a key : Investi-
gationTypeID, SourceID, AnalystID, ClientID, IncidentID, EventID, since we as-
sumed such a combination would always be unique for the all investigation logs (e.g.,
MI;01;01;25;50001;36505). However, in real logs we found it is not possible to have
all values of these six values present in all logs. In other words, in each row related to
one investigation, some attributes may not have their related value. For instance, we
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203547 1432954820387 1432954834974 MI A 130 0 33906 4 15 0 1210176
203548 1432954834974 1432954851571 MI A 105 0 33906 4 15 0 1210176
203549 1432954851571 1432954857971 MI C 104 0 33906 4 15 0 1210176
203550 1432954857971 1432954868877 MI C 110 0 33906 4 15 0 1210176
203551 1432954868877 1432954934995 MI A 107 1 33906 4 15 0 1210176
203552 1432954934995 1432955078419 MI E 119 0 33906 4 15 0 1210176
203553 1432955078419 1432955083059 MI C 112 0 33906 4 15 500204 1210176
203554 1432955083059 1432955083059 MI E 121 0 33906 4 15 500204 1210176
Table 7: Log entries of one investigation related to MI investigation type
may have SourceID in just second or third row of logs. By this observation, we added
a new attribute, InvID, to the log format as a primary key of each single investigation
record. Dataset pre-processing is detailed in Section 5.1.
Table 7 shows a sequence of logs belonging to one investigation, containing three
steps and eight actions(A:130 221A:105 221C:104 221C:110 221A:107221E:119 221C:112
221E:121). This investigation path is illustrated in the investigation model shown in
Figure 4 as specified by the double boxes. By comparing the combined key of each
log, which is StepID:ActionID, the tool can map the log to a node of the model (the
analyst is performing which step and action). By looking at all logs and mapping
them to related nodes in the investigation model, we can see which path is followed
by the analyst. Furthermore, By identifying the path followed by an analyst in the
investigation model, the feedback module can notify analysts about probable next




In this chapter, we elaborate the system modules and their functionalities. Then, we
describe the employed methodology and detailed implementation of each module.
4.1 Overview of The System
The designed system assists both managers and analysts as a value-added component
of the SOC Console. Once investigation modeling and logging phases are completed, it
is possible to implement four modules with different functionalities. The independent
graphical user interface with the three modules; monitoring, measuring, and simu-
lation helps managers to evaluate the operational SOC performance. In addition,
the feedback module assists analysts of the SOC by notifying them with different
information through the Microsoft Windows operating system tray, while they are
performing investigations through the SOC Console.
The implemented system by four components satisfies different objectives. The
monitoring module makes tracking and monitoring analysts’ activities possible. The
measuring module empowers managers to check SOC’s performance with different
metrics provided by the tool. Furthermore, customizable OLAP analysis is integrated
into the tool, providing more detailed analysis performance results. The simulation
module facilitates evaluating improvement options by two different approaches: 1.
Modifying different analysis steps’ duration to see how the total analysis duration
would be affected by an improved step. 2. Applying a different queueing model
and alert dispatching approach to see how the overall performance would be affected.
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The feedback module, by employing the investigation model and comparing it with
ongoing investigations, can reveal anomalies in terms of analysis approach or time.
It can also remind analysts about next possible steps. Furthermore, this module
considers completed investigations as valuable historical results to be retrieved and
shared with other analysts.
A general workflow of the designed system is shown in Figure 5, where activity
logs are being gathered from analysts’ machines and stored in the database. The main
GUI including the monitoring, the measuring, and the simulation modules keeps read-
ing the database and provides different capabilities to the managers. The feedback
module works as a background service to give feedback to analysts in real time.
Figure 5: The proposed system architecture
4.1.1 Monitoring Module
Figure 6 shows the monitoring module of the managers’ GUI. This module is provided
to illustrate the detailed information of the SOC ongoing investigations in an easy-
to-understand way. The main purpose is showing which analyst is performing which
type of investigation for which client. Investigations started within a configurable
period (e.g., 30 minutes) stay in the graphical plot.
By looking at the plot, the y-axis shows different investigations, the x-axis shows
the investigation duration. Each stacked bar is an ongoing investigation in the SOC.
A vertical line, drawn on the plot dividing a stacked bar to two, represents the current
time. The stacked bar on the left side of the vertical line shows completed steps of the
investigation, and a bar on the right side is the representation of the next predicted
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Figure 6: The monitoring module dashboard
step. Next step prediction is done by mapping the ongoing investigation to the rele-
vant model, which will be detailed in section 4.2.1. The plot is continuously updated
after configurable time intervals by reading new data from database incrementally.
By considering investigation number 2 in the monitoring module in Figure 6, we
describe an example to elaborate the plot. As is shown, steps A, and O are performed
for the investigation number 2 in the figure, since they are on the left side of the
vertical line. Step IDs are displayed at the bottom side of the bar, where related
duration are shown on the top. For instance, for step A, duration is 2:04. The time
format is minutes and seconds (mm:ss). The next step predicted by the tool is shown
next to the completed steps after the vertical line. The predicted step is O in this
case, as the tool expects step O is still going on. The duration of the predicted step
is based on the historical average of a step calculated from previous investigations in
the database.
On the left side of a stacked bar, some information such as investigation type,
analyst ID and client ID related to the investigation are shown. As we can see, for
the investigation number 2, Investigation type is PV. Analyst ID and Client ID are
1 and 501 respectively. By clicking on the plot more detailed information will be
provided. For instance, by clicking on the left side of the plot, as we can see in




To understand the SOC performance better, measuring becomes necessary. A recent
book on IT security metrics [48] states that every metric which can reduce the uncer-
tainty is a good metric. Qualitative measurement usually is ignored as it is difficult
or expensive to be scaled. Therefore, the measuring module provides managers with
quantitative measurements of the SOC performance.
To the best of our knowledge, there do not exist SOC analysis performance studies
in the literature. In a recent paper [11], Jacobs et al. examined different aspects of
three real-world operational SOCs. They expressed one performance metric consid-
ered in one operational SOC as the number of analyzed incidents per analyst daily.
It is described that counting the number of incidents solely is not a good metric,
if the time duration of analysis is not considered. Efforts on difficult investigations
which take more time to analyze reduce the total number of processed incidents. As
a result, analysts are not motivated to analyze carefully, since it results in showing
lower productivity for them in managers’ point of view. In a university SOC assessed
in the same work [11], a ticketing system dispatching alert tickets to analysts, pro-
vides a performance metric which is time spent on each ticket; however more detailed
information is not provided in [11].
The measuring module is designed to provide various SOC’s performance metrics
to evaluate SOC behavior. By having analysts’ activity logs from the SOC Console,
providing different performance metrics from different perspectives is possible.
We enumerate different metrics provided by the measuring module. Important
results, such as the maximum values, are shown in the main GUI where detailed
analysis is reachable through different buttons. Figure 7 shows the measuring module
dashboard, and the two detailed analysis reports are open in the two windows.
The first group of metrics provides different average analysis time (AAT) from
different perspectives. Total AAT which is the average duration of investigations
regardless of any condition gives a general inference about overall performance of
the SOC. AAT of each investigation type, each analyst, and each client are metrics
focusing on those parameters. By these performance metrics, it is possible to identify
time consuming investigation types, demanding clients, and fast analysts. With the
last 4 metrics, more detailed information is provided for managers to see which analyst
is faster for which investigation type, which client is demanding for which investigation
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Figure 7: The measuring module dashboard
type, and which analyst is taking more time for which client, which can imply not
knowing the client well.
• Total average analysis time.
• Average analysis time of each investigation type
• Average analysis time of each analyst
• Average analysis time of each client
• Average analysis time of different analysts for each investigation type.
• Average analysis time of different investigation types for each client.
• Average analysis time of different analysts for each client.
The second group of performance metrics concentrates on average duration of
different investigation steps. This group attempts to show steps’ average duration in
general, for different analysts, and different clients.
• Ranking analysis steps according to the time spent in executing them.
• Average analysis time of different analysts for each Step.
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• Average analysis time of different clients for each Step.
The third group is about showing maximum values for some performance metrics
in the managers’ GUI. This group helps managers to determine if maximum values
are significantly different from average durations.
• Identifying which investigation type takes more time to be analyzed.
• Which step of which investigation type takes more time to be analyzed.
• Which analyst has the highest average time for which investigation type.
• Which client has the highest average time for which investigation type.
• Which analyst has the highest average time for which client.
The fourth group is the number of created and updated incidents for different
parameters.
• The number of created and updated incidents for each investigation type.
• The number of created and updated incidents for each analyst.
• The number of created and updated incidents for each client.
OLAP component
An Online Analytical Processing (OLAP) tool is employed beside the designed mea-
suring module inside the managers’ GUI. OLAP empowers managers to create new
analysis queries with mouse dragging and clicking instead of modifying code or writ-
ing complicated SQL queries. An open-source web-based OLAP engine, Community
Edition Saiku (CE Saiku) [49], is integrated into the GUI providing customized data
analysis opportunities. CE Saiku is implemented by Pivot4J Java API using Mon-
drian OLAP server. We integrate web-based Saiku to the managers’ desktop GUI by
embedding a browser.




The simulation module is designed to show effects of potential changes on the in-
vestigation workflow. It simulates the effect of a change on real activity logs, and
recalculates performance metrics. It helps the managers to prioritize efforts on po-
tential improvements of the SOC. Two potential changes as simulation options are
provided. One is modifying current steps’ duration, and the other is changing the
dispatching method of alerts.
The first simulation capability is modifying specific steps’ duration by a specified
percentage to see how different performance metrics would be affected. This simula-
tion helps managers to find out whether it is the best option to optimize one specific
step to reduce the time taken by that task.
By assessing optimization options for each step, the manager decides one or more
steps duration to be modified and by a specific percentage. An optimization option
can be a possible automation for a specific step to reduce analysts’ tasks. The re-
duction percentage is the manager’s prediction as a result of that potential change
in the investigation workflow. For example, if one step is going to be automated
completely, the related duration of the step should be removed completely (reduction
percentage is 100%). The simulation is designed in a way that the simulator consid-
ers all historical database investigations containing that specific step, and modifies
all current sub-steps’ (actions) durations by the mentioned value, and recalculate all
performance metrics based on the managers assumption.
The second simulation capability is simulating the dispatching phase of incoming
alerts among analysts with a different queueing model. Different ways of dispatching
services (alerts) among servers (analysts) is usually studied as queuing models [50].
In our work, a different alert dispatching method is simulated to assess the employed
approach effect on the SOC performance metrics.
The result of both simulation scenarios is shown side by side with the real one
(measuring module) in the GUI to ease the comparison process for managers. Figure 8
shows an example of the provided simulation results beside the measuring module. In
this way, comparing the effect of the simulation scenario on actual SOC performance
metrics is easy for the managers. For instance, as we see in Figure 8, the simulation
reduces the average time of analysis from 6:41 to 5:53. By the measuring module
results, we see the most time consuming investigation type is PV with the average
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of 10:17, the conducted simulation reduces it to 6:03 however the investigation type
is not changed. Moreover, we can compare easily that the biggest investigation type
average duration belongs to AnalystID 2 for PV with the average of 45:05, and this
simulation changes it to AnalystID 4 for MI with the average of 11:42.
Figure 8: The results of the simulation module alongside the measuring module
4.1.4 Feedback Module
The feedback module is designed for knowledge transfer among SOC analysts. Knowl-
edge can be a hint about next required action to proceed in the investigation, notifying
the analyst about anomalous durations and missing steps, or showing the result of
previous similar investigation types performed by other analysts. The analysts are
firstly notified about mentioned information in the Windows operating system tray,
and the summary of all notifications are accessible in a desktop GUI.
The feedback Module works as a background service uninterruptedly as analysts
activity logs are being stored in the database. It keeps reading the database, and
mapping them to the investigation model. As a result, the system can notify analysts
about next probable steps, find anomalies, and warn analysts about them. The
module reminds the analyst what is the probable next step based on the step he is
currently performing. Anomaly notifications are about spending normal duration on
the steps, or not missing an action. For instance, If the analyst takes 50% (which
is configurable) less or more time than the historical average duration of the step,
he will be warned. If the analyst’s activities does not match one of the investigation
model’s paths, he will receive a warning about the missing steps.
27
Moreover, once an analyst starts to perform an investigation, the feedback module
shows previous investigations activity logs of the same type by different analysts.
This feature provides background knowledge from other analysts’ approaches with
different clients, or result of similar investigations for the same client. The results can
be filtered by a specific client to provide knowledge whether the client recently had the
same event type, what was the result, which source or destination IP were involved,
etc. The main investigation approaches adopted by analysts are the same. However,
analysts’ knowledge can be improved over time with experiences and knowing clients’
environment better. Moreover, the feedback module shows results of investigations
which can help the next analyst to have an inference about similar situations, for
instance, the same event is generated for the same source and destination IP which
was false positive before. Then, the next analyst by knowing the history of the client
about this specific event, and result of previous analyst’s investigation, can take a
faster action with the knowledge of previous analyst.
The feedback module is shown in Figure 9. As is shown, different hints are pro-
vided to the analyst. The analysts receive notifications in real time about their
ongoing investigations in the Windows operating system tray, where all notification
reports are accessible by the GUI.
Figure 9: The feedback module notifications and reports
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4.2 Implementation
In this section, the methodology and implementation details of each module are dis-
cussed. All modules are implemented in Python 2.7 programming language and
existing libraries.
For the managers’ GUI, since three modules (monitoring, measuring, and simu-
lation) are integrated in the same window, threading objects [51] are used to serve
each module’s refreshing time. In this way, different updating times for each mod-
ule (specifically, monitoring and measuring) does not block the main program. Both
monitoring and measuring modules are updated periodically after configurable time
intervals in the managers’ GUI.
The smallest scale of time duration shown in different modules of the tool is step’s
duration. Series of actions are grouped to a step representing a task.
Moreover, All configurable parameters mentioned in the work are reachable in a
single table in the database.
4.2.1 Monitoring Module
The characteristics of the visualized plot are discussed in Section 4.1.1. Visualization
of the monitoring module is implemented with Matplotlib package [52] in Python. As
is discussed, the plot is being continuously updated after configurable time intervals.
With each update, the plot is refreshed, and recent logs, which are performed steps
from the last update, are added to the plot. Here, the employed methodology to
implement the module is discussed.
In each update, the module fetches StepID and ActionID from the last log of the
investigation, and composes the mapping key. Then, it maps the key value to the
relevant node of the investigation model. By traversing the investigation model, it
can recognize what is the next probable action. If the next node is End, it shows
the investigation is completed, otherwise it shows the next probable action and step.
Moreover, it is possible to have more than one action as the next probable actions,
since there are several paths due to decision nodes and integration of all possible
paths. In this case, the predicted bar after the vertical line (shown in the plot) will
be in black-color meaning there are some probable actions based on the current action.
A white-color bar means there is only one possibility as a next action.
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The estimated duration of a predicted step in the plot is calculated based on the
average duration of a step from historical data. It is also possible that the analyst
is in the middle of one step, in this way the next predicted StepID is the same as
the performed step. For plotting it, the StepID will be the same, where the related
estimated duration will be the subtraction of performed duration of the step from the
total average of the step.
Differentiating between performed steps (past) and predicted steps (future) in the
plot is achieved by the vertical line. To plot the vertical line representing current time,
the tool fetches all performed steps’ durations from the database into the memory as
negative values, and historical average durations for the predicted steps as positive
values.
Two dictionaries are defined to read data into the memory to plot investigation
details as stacked bars. Dictionaries are a data structure in Python as a pair of key-
value. Considering a single investigation, there are two dictionaries containing steps’
durations of the investigation. The key of both dictionaries are InvID, where the
values of keys are different. One dictionary values are series of performed StepIDs
duration, and the other is average duration of predicted step (which could be more
than one). InvID is the dimension of y-axis which is the same for both dictionaries,
and the duration of different StepIDs, which are the length of different steps, are
illustrated as x-axis. As is described, performed steps’ durations are stored as negative
values in one dictionary, and predicted step’s duration is stored as a positive value
in another. In this way, negative and positive values related to the same InvID are
plotted on the same y axis, where performed steps and the predicted step can be
differentiated by the vertical line.
4.2.2 Measuring Module
The measuring module is designed to provide SOC performance statistics with differ-
ent metrics. The SOC performance metrics are described in Section 4.1.2. By having
the measurable investigation workflow, performance metrics can be calculated by run-
ning SQL queries on the database. The duration of an investigation is measurable
from provided analysts’ activity logs with different attributes.
PostgreSQL [53] as a free and open source object-relational database system is
employed in the implementation supporting SQL standard queries.
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The first and most important basic SQL query is the one to calculate a single
investigation duration. For calculating the related duration of one investigation, by
considering the InvID, all actions’ durations belonging to the same step are added
together. Then, all steps of the InvID are summed to represent the investigation
duration.
Since in reality there is a high chance of either skipping or redoing actions by
analysts, we do not put any limitation regarding number of actions that could be
added together for one step. As long as they are related to the same step of same
investigation with the unique InvID, duration times are added together.
By the employed methodology, we have different durations related to each ac-
tion, each step, and the entire investigation. Having duration of each step of the
investigation model provides the opportunity to perform average queries from spe-
cific perspectives, such as average of each step by each analyst. For example, it is
possible to look at performance of each analyst for each step to see who can manage
which step in a better way.
Having the duration of each single investigation in the database provides the
opportunity to perform average queries to calculate the investigation average duration
from different point of views, such as investigation average duration of each analyst,
investigation average duration of each client, etc.
Saiku OLAP Configuration
The functionality of web-based OLAP application, Saiku, is discussed in the subsec-
tion of Section 4.1.2. Saiku is integrated into the managers’ GUI next to measuring
module to provide more statistics on investigation logs. Besides OLAP configura-
tion for the SOC database, it is described how to integrate web-based OLAP in the
desktop GUI.
The employed package for integrating browser into the desktop GUI is CEF python
[54]. By this package, A web browser is embedded in one tab of the GUI. By setting
the web address of configured Saiku for the browser, managers can work with Saiku
application through the GUI.
Configuring the OLAP tool is accomplished by designing a schema. Schema as
a logical model defines the data format for calculations. Dimensions are the at-
tributes that we want to measure (e.g., InvestigationTypeID attribute). Measures
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are those quantitative attributes (e.g., TimeStart attribute) related to dimensions.
Calculations on measures are defined by different aggregators, such as sum, count,
avg, etc. One cube can contain several dimensions and measures to represent data
in a multidimensional form. A schema (logical model) can lead to many cubes con-
taining different dimensions and measures. In the following, the implemented cube
to measure investigation durations is described.
The schema containing one cube is designed by considering different attributes
of analysts’ activity logs to provide detailed investigation measurement to managers.
Dimensions considered for the cube are: investigation types, analysts, and clients.
Related measures are: TimeStart, TimeEnd, and InvID. For each measure, we should
set a proper aggregator. For TimeStart and TimeEnd attributes, the aggregator is
sum. For InvID, the aggregator is distinct-count counting the number of distinct
values (the measure is called “Number of Investigations”).
By simply using aggregators on measures of dimensions, SOC performance metrics
cannot be directly achieved. We employ the method, calculated member, to facilitate
writing formulas to combine different measures together. For instance, as a basic
calculation, different investigations’ durations are calculated. Then by using the cal-
culated member, we calculate the average of investigation durations. The calculated
member is “Average per Investigation”.
Once the cube is configured in the XML format, managers can make different
queries by dragging and dropping listed dimensions and measures. For example, by
selecting the dimension “Investigation Type” and the measure “Number of Investi-
gations”, we can see how many investigations are performed for each investigation
type in the dataset. If we add other dimensions, such as analysts and clients, as well
as more measures, such as “Average per Investigation”, detailed information will be
shown. Figure 10 is part of the result of this example, and the time is in minutes.
It shows which analysts performed which investigation types (here analysts #3 and
#4 performed the investigation type AA), which analysts performed the investigation
type for which client (here analyst#3 performed the investigation for client#67), and
the investigation average duration for the client analyzed by the analyst.
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Figure 10: Partial OLAP analysis results
4.2.3 Simulation Module
None of the two simulation scenarios affect the production database. The alert dis-
patching simulation is provided in a replicated database by storing the simulated
logs, and the modifying steps’ duration simulation is performed by SQL queries in
real time.
Modifying Steps’ Duration
For modifying steps duration, different SQL queries are provided to simulate the same
performance metrics as measuring module metrics. There are different SQL queries
than measuring module queries, since simulation queries firstly apply the reduction
percentage for the target steps in every investigation, then calculate different perfor-
mance metrics and show the results with the same format of the measuring module.
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Alert Dispatching Method
The default alert dispatching method is assigning the same number of clients to the
available analysts of a work shift. Analysts are responsible for their assigned clients
and work independently. For instance, we have five available analysts and 15 clients,
each three clients are assigned to one analyst regardless of any consideration. This
approach has some pitfalls, such as the possibility of assigning clients with high load
of alerts to the same analyst, where the other analyst is assigned clients with low load
of alerts. It is also possible that two clients assigned to the same analyst are under
attack at the same time, and the analyst cannot handle both of them at the same
time, where none of clients of the other analyst are in such a critical situation.
The employed simulation method follows single-queue, multiple-servers method-
ology. Considering several servers serving clients from a single queue is known as the
M/M/c model where c is the number of servers [50]. The discipline in these systems
is first-come, first-served and the arrival rate of jobs is based on Poisson process.
We employ a job routing idea proposed by Armony [55], named Fastest Servers
First (FSF). The idea is routing the incoming jobs to the fastest servers first resulting
in the overall performance improvement for the system. In our work, a fastest server
is the analyst with the lower average analysis duration for an assigned investigation
type.
In order to dispatch each alert from the queue, average analysis durations of
different analysts for the related investigation type are calculated, and the alert is
assigned to the most efficient analyst for that investigation type. For example, if the
incoming investigation type is MI; the simulator knows the analyst#6 is the most
efficient available analyst for this type, and it assigns the alert to the analyst#6. In
case the most efficient analyst is busy, it assigns it to the next best analyst.
In this simulation, two metrics will be provided to assess the effect of the simulated
method. One is the average analysis duration, and the other is the alert waiting
time. The waiting time is the time the alert stays in the SOC Console (queue) to be
analyzed. It is the subtraction of the start time of an investigation from the arrival
time of an alert in the queue. In our study, waiting time implies the response time of
the SOC to incidents which is an important factor for the managers to respect SLA
for different clients. By considering waiting time, we can also assess how the new
approach would affect the waiting time of the alerts. The simulation will be detailed
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in a case study in Section 5.3.
4.2.4 Feedback Module
WxPython user interface library [56] is used to implement the feedback module to
notify the SOC analysts of various information in the MS Window operating system
tray and the desktop GUI. Different methodologies, such as finding missing steps,
predicting the next step and its estimated duration, revealing duration anomalies,
and displaying previous similar investigations details to analysts are employed by
this module.
Mapping analysts’ activity logs to the investigation model to find the path followed
by analysts is discussed in section 3.2. Predicting the next step and its estimated
duration is also discussed in details in section 4.2.1, since the monitoring module has
the same feature to show next probable steps to the managers.
The algorithm to find missing steps maps analysts’ incoming activity logs to the
investigation model continuously to see whether a step is missed. It starts checking
logs of one investigation from the first log. It checks every two successive logs (adja-
cent) in the database to see whether they are also successive in the model. If they
are not adjacent in the model, there is one or more missing nodes between them.
Another algorithm is employed to find a shortest path between two nodes. Since it
is possible to have several paths between two nodes, the shortest path, including less
nodes, is selected to report missing actions or steps.
In order to report duration anomalies, as some analysts may not spend enough
time on some steps, a dynamic duration standard is provided base on historical data
for each specific step. The standard duration is considered as real-time average of
historical data in a range, as follows.
(1−n) ∗AverageDuration < StandardDuration < (1+n) ∗AverageDuration (1)
For instance, by applying the above formula, if n is 20% and Average is 60 sec,
normal duration range is between 48 and 72. The alternative range percentage is
configurable.
Once an analyst starts to perform an investigation, previous investigations logs of
the same EventID will be shown to the analyst. As is discussed in Section 2, several
alert types (EventID) are categorized to investigation types. Since investigation types
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are general categories, investigations of the same EventID are shown to the analysts




Three case studies are elaborated in this section to show the effect of the designed
system on improvement of the SOC performance. Firstly, we go through the dataset
pre-processing and provide different statistics of the dataset.
5.1 Dataset Pre-processing
A pre-processing step is implemented to remove data-gathering mistakes resulting in
out-of-range values, impossible data combinations, and missing values. As is discussed
in Section 3.2, each row of analysts’ activity logs represents one single action of one
investigation performed by an analyst with different attributes (TimeStart, TimeEnd,
InvestigationTypeID, StepID, ActionID, SourceID, EventID, AnalystID, ClientID,
IncidentID, InvID). The duration of each action is calculated by the subtraction of
TimeStart from TimeEnd. The duration of relevant actions of one specific step will be
added together to represent the step’s duration. Then, accumulated steps’ durations
form the investigation duration.
Out of range values implies those steps’ durations which are too long compared to
real durations and need to be normalized. For instance, when normal step’s duration
is in a range of 10 minutes and information from the gathered log shows the duration
is one hour, which is abnormal. One possible reason for these abnormal cases is that
the TimeEnd of each action is considered as TimeStart of the next action. Therefore,
if there is a gap (e.g., analysts take a leave) between sequential actions, the large
duration is possible. Such large duration for steps is considered as a noise in our
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dataset and is normalized. More specifically, steps duration more than 30 minutes is
considered as a noise and normalized in the preprocessing phase.
Impossible data combination emerges after analyzing each single investigation
logs. There can be different ClientIDs in one investigation related to a specific client,
since logging the analysts’ activities by our system is tracking their mouse clicks and
it is possible that analysts mistakenly click on the other parts of the SOC Console
relevant to other clients than the one they are performing an investigation for. This
kind of noise also needs to be removed from the dataset to fit data into the tool.
Missing values are about non-existent values for different attributes of a log entry.
During the logging phase, the recording log system does not guarantee to provide
values for all attributes (InvestigationTypeID, SourceID, EventID, IncidentID) for
each single action of investigation which is one row of log entries. It is possible that
some values are not retrievable, and they will be filled by zero automatically; however,
those values can be retrieved by looking at the entire investigation logs. Zero values
could appear in two situations; either when all values of one attribute are zero in
the investigation log entries, or some of them are zero. If all values of one attribute
related to an investigation are zero, it means the value could not be fetched during
logging phase which is considered as unknown. If even one of the values is filled by
a value rather than zero, other zero values related to the same attribute should be
replaced by that value in the pre-processing phase.
It is observed there are some investigations with zero or milliseconds duration,
which are more related to false positive or contextual events. Analysts close these
events immediately resulting in very fast investigations. Contextual events can be dif-
ferent assets syslogs such as failure login attempts that could be suspicious in specific
situations. Once analysts infer nothing goes wrong, they clean them from the alert
queue without much investigation. Since these short investigations affect different
performance metrics enormously, investigations without expanding alert content are
eliminated from the dataset.
Different activity logs from different analysts’ machines are being gathered and
stored at the same time by the logging script. Firstly, different analysts’ activity
logs are separated from each other ordered by time. Then, different investigations
of the same analyst are distinguishable from each other by a specific ActionID. A
new investigation starts with ActionID# 130. By separating each investigation from
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others, we are able to assign each investigation a unique identifier as InvID.
Here, we provide an example of one investigation activity logs to show the pre-
processing phase which is performed to prepare raw logs to fit into the table of
database. Table 8 represents raw data in a text format file and Figure 11 shows
processed data placed in the database. At first glance, Figure 11 has two more at-
tributes than Table 8, the first attribute is ID, an auto increment primary key of the
table, and the last attribute is InvID. All related log entries of a single investigation























































1432357758628 1432357765749 0 1 130 0 0 2 10 0
1432357765749 1432357822688 0 1 105 0 0 2 10 0
1432357822688 1432358143981 1 1 107 0 34463 2 10 0
1432358143981 1432358146472 0 16 103 0 0 2 10 0
1432358146472 1432358250989 0 16 127 0 0 2 10 0
1432358250989 1432358250989 1 2 125 0 34463 2 10 0
Table 8: Raw activity logs in the format of text file
InvestigationTypeID and StepID values are mapped from numbers to predefined
codes of the system in the pre-processing phase. For instance, in the text file, value
1 for the InvestigationTypeID attribute is an identifier of Policy Violation (PV) in-
vestigation type. Consequently, those numbers are mapped to the abbreviated forms
of their investigation type names. Similarly, it is done for StepID attribute, codes
1, 2, 3, ... are mapped to A, B, C, ... respectively. In Table 8, we can see values
of InvestigationTypeID attribute are zero and one, firstly all values of this attribute
are changed to one. Then all values are mapped to PV as we see in Figure 11. If all
those values related to the InvestigationTypeID were zero, it would mean the Inves-
tigationTypeID was not retrievable. And, the algorithm would assign OTHERS type
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Figure 11: Rows of logs related to one investigation placed in the database
for the InvestigationTypeID, since it was not related to a known investigation type.
There is a possibility when an analyst is not convinced about an action and he
will repeat it. Consequently, it is possible to see two or more log entries with a same
ActionID happening one after another with different TimeStart and TimeEnd values.
As the algorithm adds actions’ durations related to the same step together, only spent
durations on one step will be considered.
5.1.1 Statistics of Dataset
Our dataset is categorized into three different classes based on investigations results.
As is discussed, an investigation can result in creating a new incident, updating one
of current incidents, or closing the alert. When the related investigation of an alert
results in creating an incident, it indicates a possible threat confirmed by an analyst’s
indications (proofs). Then the analyst contacts the related client for the incident
escalation based on the escalation grid. The incident is open till the related client
either confirms or clarifies the situation. In this gap (client’s response), which could
be from one day to one week depends on incident criticality, incoming alerts will be
added to the current incident. Updating the recorded incident with more alerts or
client’s response forms the category of updating incidents. False positive alerts are
categorized into the closed alerts class.
The time period of the dataset is from June 2015 to August 2015 for 57 days. 6
analysts perform alert analysis for 40 clients. The time duration format in Table 9, and
all following tables is mm:ss. As is shown, 40.7% of investigations result in creating
or updating incidents, where 59.3% of total investigations are about closing alerts
after an investigation. Average analysis duration of investigations ending in creating
new incidents is 17:52, while average duration of updating an incident and closing
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Parameters New Updated Closed Total
Incidents Incidents Alerts Dataset
Number of log entries 3301 1558 9380 14239
Number of investigations 194 331 765 1290
Proportion 15.04% 25.66% 59.3% 100%
Total average analysis duration 17:52 06:41 05:16 07:32
Average duration of fastest analyst 12:10 03:59 04:44 06:22
Average duration of slowest analyst 22:38 09:46 11:27 11:52
Table 9: The dataset statistics
an alert are 06:41, 05:16, respectively. Moreover, different analysts have different
average analysis durations. The slowest analyst’s average duration is 11:52 whereas
the fastest one is 06:22.
The different average investigation durations of different investigation types are
shown in Table 10 based on three investigation results. For each column, the first
element is the number of related investigations, and the second is the average in-
vestigation duration. For all investigation types, we can see the average duration of
creating a new incident category is longer compared to updating the incident and
closing the alert categories. EVS, MI, BFA and PV investigation types take more
time to gather indications to create an incident than AA, DOS, and OTHERS. Most
popular attack type is MI with 47 distinct incidents in the dataset, whereas DOS has
the least number of created incidents, 4. After MI, other two popular attack types are
BFA and PV. Since the number of cases for OTHERS type is much more than other
known categories, it is not mentioned in our comparisons for known investigation
types.
For almost all investigation types, average time of updating an incident is more
than closing the alert of the same type. Exception is the AA type whose number of
related cases (#2) for updated ones is not enough to be considered as a counterex-
ample. However EVS attack type takes more time to be confirmed as an incident,
average duration of getting closed is the least (03:27) among other types. The most
time consuming investigation type for updating an incident is PV type, which is
reasonable as it mostly needs communicating with the client to clarify the situation.
Looking at the total dataset statistics, MI, BFA, and PV are most time consuming
alert types in the SOC regardless of the investigation result. The number of received
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Investigation New Updated Closed Total
Type Incidents Incidents Alerts Dataset
- # Avg # Avg # Avg # Avg
EVS 6 20:50 11 06:28 91 03:27 108 04:43
MI 47 20:31 68 07:04 183 06:22 298 08:45
BFA 24 20:18 17 08:38 102 05:16 143 08:11
PV 20 19:46 10 10:17 80 05:41 110 08:40
AA 6 19:27 2 01:10 67 05:25 75 06:25
DOS 4 17:35 5 08:13 77 04:55 86 05:41
OTHERS 87 15:02 218 06:17 165 04:58 470 07:26
Table 10: The dataset statistics regarding different investigation types. Here, average
values are time duration in the format of mm:ss, and the other column (#) is the
number of instances.
alerts from these attack types is highest beside EVS, although EVS alerts are analyzed
quickly. Trend shows MI type has the highest number of investigations (298), and
the highest average analysis time (08:45).
5.2 Case Study I, Modifying the Duration of Steps
This case study is about assessing potential steps which could be automated to im-
prove overall performance. Every change in a system needs to be assessed before
going into production. After going through all steps that analysts perform for an
alert investigation, two possible automation options are recognized. One is about
checking clients’ assets and the other is about checking escalation grid. These two
are considered as potential improvements to the current investigation workflow.
5.2.1 Checking clients’ assets (part of step C)
As described before, there is one step about checking a client’s assets. The reason
behind checking the client’s assets is to assure the raised alert matches to the assets’
vulnerabilities. For instance, if the raised alert is about vulnerabilities of a specific
version of software and the client does not have that specific version, then raised alert
is apparently false positive. This example could be extended to all kind of assets,
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resources, and different related versions and patches.
A possible solution to automate this step is correlating alerts with the events
triggered by vulnerability scan of a client’s assets. In other words, alerts can be
correlated based on the client’s assets vulnerabilities for not raising FP alerts. In this
way, this task could be handled by the SOC automation solution than the human
analysts.
In this simulation scenario, we assess how the possible solution would affect the
SOC performance. As we know, investigations can result in three different categories,
creating a new incident, updating the current incident, or closing the alert as FP. For
the first two categories (creating or updating incidents), the simulation is done in a
way that the related actions’ duration to asset checking are eliminated completely,
then average analysis durations are recalculated to show the improvement. For the
investigations of the closing alerts category containing this step, a careful observa-
tion is made whether the reason for closing the alert was about mismatching asset’s
vulnerabilities and the raised alert. If the condition is true, we claim the entire in-
vestigation was useless, since by implementing the provided solution, there would be
no more FP alert in this regard. As a result, FP alert reduction aside, analysts’ time
would be saved. If the alert is not closed immediately after checking this step, we
just deduct this step duration from the investigation duration.
For the first two categories of investigations (creating and updating an incident),
we remove related actions for checking assets, then following simulated results are
calculated. Table 11 shows the results for creating a new incident class, where the
dataset average, the simulated average and the reduction ratio are represented in this
table. Generally, 48.45% of investigations in this class contains an asset checking step
which is involved in this simulation. The total average of this investigation class is
decreased by 7.55%. The most affected investigation types are AA, EVS, and MI.
Table 12 depicts the simulation result of the updating incidents class, where 12.69% of
investigations has the asset checking step. The total average of this class is decreased
by 6.98%.
For the closing alerts category, the step for checking a client’s asset is performed in
30.2% of investigations (231 out of 765 investigations) which can be eliminated from
the analysis process similar to other two investigation categories scenarios. Specif-
ically, 41 out of 231 (17.75%) alerts of these investigations are closed immediately
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Investigation Type Dataset Average Simulation Average Reduction Ratio
EVS 20:50 18:17 12.24%
MI 20:31 18:15 11.05%
BFA 20:18 19:22 4.6%
PV 19:46 19:25 1.77%
AA 19:27 16:13 16.62%
DOS 17:35 16:57 3.6%
OTHERS 15:02 14:01 7.62%
Table 11: Class: creating new incidents; 94 out of 194 investigations (48.45%) contain
step C. By the simulation, the total average analysis duration decreases from 17:52
to 16:31, or 7.55%.
Investigation Type Dataset Average Simulation Average Reduction Ratio
EVS 06:28 05:10 20.10%
MI 07:04 06:24 9.43%
BFA 08:38 06:47 21.43%
PV 10:17 09:08 11.18%
AA 01:10 00:30 57.14%
DOS 08:13 08:13 0.0%
OTHERS 06:17 06:04 3.45%
Table 12: Class: updating incidents; 42 out of 331 investigations (12.69%) contain
step C. By the simulation, the total average analysis duration decreases from 06:41
to 06:13, or 6.98%.
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Investigation Dataset Average after Final Reduction
Type Average eliminating investigations Simulation Ratio
EVS 03:27 03:28 3:11 8.17%
MI 06:22 06:14 5:44 8.02%
BFA 05:16 05:19 5:01 5.64%
PV 05:41 05:55 5:36 5.35%
AA 05:25 05:08 4:59 2.92%
DOS 04:55 04:55 4:46 3.05%
OTHERS 04:58 04:50 4:35 5.17%
Table 13: Class: closing alerts; 5.36% of investigations are removed, 231 out of 724
investigations (31.9%) are involved in this simulation. By the simulation, the total
average analysis duration decreases from 05:12 to 04:54, or 5.77%.
after checking the step indicating useless investigations. Since they are closed imme-
diately after this step, it is assumed that the raised alerts did not match the assets
vulnerabilities. As a result, they could be cleaned from the alerts repository before
reaching analysts’ SOC Console. By implementing the solution, the rate of false
positive alerts would be decreased by 5.36% (41 out of 765) in this class, where 266
minutes of analysts time (around four and a half hours) would be saved. For the
remaining 190 investigations containing this step, we eliminate the asset checking
step and recalculate the results for the closing alerts category. Results are shown in
Table 13 illustrating 7.28% decrease in the total average analysis duration.
Considering all investigation categories together, Table 14 illustrates different sim-
ulated average analysis durations for different investigation types. After removing 41
investigations from the closed alerts category, 29.38% of investigations are affected
by this scenario, and the total average analysis duration decreases by 6.83%. The
most affected attack types are EVS, MI, and BFA, where PV and DOS attacks are
improved to a lower degree.
Considering investigation classes, the summary of simulation results is shown in
Table 15.
5.2.2 Checking escalation grid (step F)
One analysis step is checking escalation grid to find out how the related client should
be informed in case of a new or updated incident. Each client’s escalation grid as an
informative document is accessible through some mouse clicks in the SOC Console.
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Investigation Type Dataset Average after Final Reduction
Type Average eliminating investigations Simulation Ratio
EVS 04:43 04:46 4:15 10.84%
MI 08:45 08:49 7:58 9.64%
BFA 08:11 08:19 7:42 7.41%
PV 08:40 08:59 8:36 4.27%
AA 06:25 06:11 5:47 6.47%
DOS 05:41 05:44 5:33 3.2%
OTHERS 07:26 07:26 7:03 5.16%
Table 14: Total dataset; 29.38%, 367 out of 1249 investigations contain step C (41
investigations are removed from 1290 total investigations, as is discussed for the closed
alerts category). By the simulation, the total average analysis duration decreases from
07:34 to 07:03, or 6.83%.
Investigation Dataset Simulation Involved Reduction
Class Average Average Proportion Percentage
Creating new incidents 17:52 16:31 48.45% 7.55%
Updating incidents 06:41 06:13 12.69% 6.98%
Closing alerts 05:12 04:54 31.9% 5.77%
Total dataset 07:34 07:03 29.38% 6.83%
Table 15: The summary of simulation results for different investigation classes
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Investigation Type Dataset Average Simulation Average Reduction Ratio
EVS 20:50 20:36 1.12%
MI 20:31 20:06 2.03%
BFA 20:18 20:06 0.98%
PV 19:46 19:43 0.25%
AA 19:27 19:01 2.23%
DOS 17:35 17:28 0.66%
OTHERS 15:02 14:52 1.11%
Table 16: Class: creating new incidents; 58 out of 194 investigations (29.9%) contain
step F. By the simulation, the total average analysis duration decreases from 17:52
to 17:38, or 1.3%
The contacting approaches can be different for each client based on severity of the
incident and the client’s preference.
A possible improvement for this step is providing information about the required
escalation method for an incident in the window of creating and updating incidents
in the SOC Console. By correlating related client escalation grid and related incident
type, the proper contact approach can be fetched and shown to the analyst as a
hint which saves him time to go through different buttons to find out the required
information. In this scenario, we observe how frequent this step is beside the average
duration analysts spending on it.
We found that 58 out of 194 (29.9%) investigations contain checking escalation grid
for the category of creating incidents. Besides, 18 out of 331 (5.44%) and 23 out of 765
(3.0%) investigations include checking escalation grid for the categories of updating
and closing incidents respectively. Since the number of involved investigations for
the last two investigation classes are not much (as expected), the simulation is only
done for the creating new incidents category. Table 16 shows the detailed simulation
results for the class of creating new incidents, where the related step is eliminated
completely. Our simulation illustrates the average investigation duration is decreased
by just 1.3%. MI and AA attack types are mostly checked for the proper escalation
method.
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Investigation Dataset Average after Simulation Reduction
Type Average eliminating investigations Average Ratio
EVS 04:43 05:18 04:46 10.06%
MI 08:45 09:46 08:48 9.9%
BFA 08:11 08:59 08:18 7.61%
PV 08:40 09:32 08:59 5.77%
AA 06:25 06:40 06:11 7.25%
DOS 05:41 05:59 05:43 4.46%
OTHERS 07:26 07:52 07:25 5.72%
Table 17: Combined effect: 41 investigations are removed resulting in an increase
in the average analysis durations shown in the third column, 377 out of 1249 inves-
tigations (30.18%) are affected by the combination of two simulation scenarios, and
decreases the total average analysis duration from 8:09 to 7:33, or 7.36% beside saving
four and a half hours man-hour.
5.2.3 Combination of two possible improvements
By combining the above two improvement options, we assess how averages would be
affected. Correlated alerts with assets’ vulnerabilities and automated shown escala-
tion grid together are simulated to show the effect on the averages. Table 17 shows
the simulation results. Firstly, by removing 41 investigations which were closed im-
mediately after checking assets’ vulnerabilities, new analysis averages are shown in
the second column indicating on an increase which means removed investigations were
part of short investigations. Then by eliminating the steps related to checking assets
and escalation grid, simulated average analysis durations are calculated and shown
in the fourth column. By employing both automation solutions, the total average
analysis duration would be decreased by 7.36%. The most effected attack types are
EVS, and MI.
5.3 Case Study II, A Different Alert Dispatching
Method
In this case study, the simulation of a different dispatching method of incoming alerts
among analysts is assessed.
The number of analysts working in the SOC is different from one work-shift to
another work-shift. For week days (Monday to Friday), there are three work-shifts
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per day; day-shift from 8:00 to 16:00, evening-shift from 16:00 to 00:00, and night-
shift from 00:00 to 8:00. For weekends, there are two 12 hours shift per day. Since
during weekend and weekdays evening and night shifts only one analyst is working,
these shifts are not considered in the dataset of this simulation. Only investigations
of the day-shift for week days with more than two analysts are considered for this
simulation.
In Section 5.1, it is mentioned that short investigations (with milliseconds du-
rations) are removed from the dataset. Since the number of short investigations is
significant, they affect the average time of analysis enormously. By removing short
investigations, we are able to look at the dataset and its statistics in a more accurate
way. However, in this case study since we want to simulate dispatching phase of alerts,
we need all alerts. By those removed investigations, we would have time gaps between
investigations showing that the analysts were free, which was a wrong assumption for
this simulation. Consequently, we consider a dataset containing all investigations no
matter how long they are. We consider all situations in which analysts are busy.
As is discussed, the alert waiting time is also considered as a metric to show the
effect of the simulation. In this regard, having the arrival time of alerts is necessary,
however we do not have arrival time in the provided dataset. Poisson process [57]
is employed to simulate the arrival time of alerts. Using the Poisson distribution,
we generate the desired number of random durations with a specific average in to-
tal. Summation of the waiting time with the investigation start time (timestamp)
simulates the arrival time of the alert in the queue.
Two parameters are needed to be fed the Poisson process to generate random
durations as the waiting time. One parameter is average duration time of the waiting
time which alerts stay in the queue to be analyzed. We have the average duration
as two hours asked from the SOC experts. Second parameter is the number of alerts
which we need to generate time for them. Number of alerts is counted based on the
number of investigations which we have for each work shift. For each work-shift,
the simulator counts the number of investigations, and considers 120 minutes as the
average waiting time. Then by Poisson process, it generates the same number of
durations by different values with the average of 120 minutes in total.
The arrival time stamp of an alert is the constant value which is generated by the
Poisson process. The start time of investigations changes from the original dataset
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to the simulated data. Since investigations are performed by different analysts with
different analysis durations, they affect the start time of the next investigation in the
work-shift. Consequently, we have different waiting times for the simulated investi-
gations.
In order to dispatch each alert of the queue, the simulator checks the average anal-
ysis duration of the available analysts of the work-shift for the related investigation
type. Then, the alert is assigned to the most efficient and available analyst of the
shift. The available analyst means analysts working in the work-shift, and not being
occupied by other investigations. When all analysts are occupied, next investigation
would be postponed till one analyst becomes free.
Once an investigation is assigned to an analyst by the simulator, activity logs of the
simulated investigation are simulated from the real investigation logs. The simulator
considers the same investigation path with the same number of activity logs for the
simulated investigation, where duration of the different actions (activity logs) in that
investigation are calculated based on the assigned analyst’s average analysis duration.
In other words, the duration of the simulated investigation is based on the average
analysis duration of the selected analyst for the simulation.
We know based on the different results of an investigation (e.g., closing the alert
or creating new incident), the average of the same actions are different. For simu-
lating each action duration of one investigation, the simulator calculates the average
duration of the action based on the investigation result. For example, the average
duration of expanding alert content for investigations resulting in creating new inci-
dents is 4 minutes where it is 30 seconds for investigations resulting in closing alerts.
Since the simulator knows the result of each alert investigation from the beginning,
it simulates the duration of each action based on the average duration of the related
alert investigation class.
Totally, 33 day work-shifts are considered for the simulation with the minimally
two analysts working per work-shift. For 17 work-shifts, two analysts are working
per work-shift. For 15 work-shifts, three analysts and for one work-shift four analysts
are working in the SOC in parallel. These 33 day work-shifts are selected with the
entire dataset. Table 18 shows statistics on the selected dataset for 33 day work-
shifts and simulation results. Each column represents one investigation class, such as
new incidents which first sub-column is dataset average analysis time, second one is
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simulated average analysis time, and third sub-column is the reduction ratio.
By comparing Table 9 with Table 18, we can see the proportion of the closing alerts
category increases from 59.3% to 94.12%, since all investigations of the work-shift
are considered regardless of their duration.
The simulation result in Table 18 represents the effect of the simulated dispatching
approach on the total average analysis time and waiting time of different investigation
classes and the total dataset. Total average analysis duration and waiting time of the
total dataset are improved by 4.42% , and 2.18% respectively.
Investigation classes New Incidents Updated Incidents Closed Alerts Total Dataset
# of log entries 1059 731 11181 12971
# of
investigations 75 163 3807 4045
Proportion 1.85% 4.03% 94.12% 100%
Parameters Real Simu % Real Simu % Real Simu % Real Simu %
Total average
analysis duration 18:13 16:54 7.23% 05:19 04:16 19.75% 01:25 01:25 0% 01:53 01:48 4.42%
Waiting time 120:16 116:02 3.52% 120:00 116:02 3.3% 120:06 117:34 2.11% 120:06 117:29 2.18%
Table 18: The alert dispatching method dataset statistics for 33-day work-shifts, the
simulation results and the reduction ratios.
Table 19 shows the simulation results for the different investigation types. For each
column, first sub-column is the number of investigations related to the investigation
type, second sub-column is the real dataset average analysis duration, third is the
simulated average analysis duration, and the fourth is the reduction ratio. In some
columns related to the reduction ratio, “+” is shown (e.g., +2.77%) implying the
increase percentage rather the decrease.
By looking at the results, we can say when the reduction ratio is high, it is
infer-able that either the dataset durations for those specific investigations are so
different from the average, or analysts efficiency are so different from each other for
that investigation type. For instance, we can see for the updating incidents class
related to the PV investigation type, simulated average time is decreased by 98.94%;
first point is that the number of investigations are few (#5), and the second point
is that by the simulation we interchange the real investigation duration (which can
be so far from the average) with the average analysis duration of the best analyst.
Moreover, for investigations belonging to the updating incidents class, if they are
about contacting the client, they can just contain few actions with long durations,
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and we simulate them with the average duration of that action which is shorter.
Looking at the reduction ratios of the total dataset, the most affected investigation
types are EVS, and PV showing different efficiency of analysts. Since by dispatching
the alerts to different analysts, the average analysis durations are decreased signif-
icantly. However DOS and OTHERS investigations are increased in their average
analysis duration by +5.71% and +1.98% respectively.
Inv. New Updated Closed Total
Types Incidents Incidents Alerts Dataset
- # Real Simu % # Real Simu % # Real Simu % # Real Simu %
EVS 3 15:56 13:05 17.89 7 03:56 00:25 89.41 92 01:04 00:59 7.81 102 01:42 01:18 23.53
MI 21 21:50 22:54 +4.88 38 06:47 05:42 15.97 300 02:21 01:58 16.31 359 03:58 03:35 9.66
BFA 12 22:16 22:52 +2.77 8 02:59 01:59 33.52 493 01:21 01:05 19.75 513 01:52 01:37 13.39
PV 7 18:34 11:28 38.24 5 06:18 00:04 98.94 222 01:05 01:04 1.54 234 01:43 01:21 21.36
AA 2 16:23 13:44 16.17 2 01:10 01:08 2.86 58 01:37 01:27 10.31 62 02:04 01:50 11.29
DOS - - - - 3 05:55 01:16 78.59 256 01:07 01:14 +10.45 259 01:10 01:14 +5.71
OTHERS 30 14:40 12:13 16.7 100 05:04 04:33 10.2 2386 01:23 01:28 +6.02 2516 01:41 01:43 +1.98
Table 19: The alert dispatching method dataset statistics for different investigation
types, the simulation results and the reduction ratios (the sign “+” implies an increase
than the reduction)
The proposed approach is supposed to have a better performance result when the
number of working analysts in the work-shift is more. Since we have more analysts
working per work-shift, we have more diversity in analysts’ skills. Diversity implies
the analysts with different expertise, as each analyst could be more skilled on specific
alert type and analyze that type faster. In the dataset of this simulation, we can see
that we have choices of two, three and four analysts working per work-shift.
We divide the dataset to three distinct datasets based on the number of analysts
working in work-shifts (2, 3, and 4 analysts working per workshoft). Separate three
alert dispatching simulations are done for the three datasets to show the effect of the
employed simulation approach on work-shifts with different number of analysts.
Tables 20 and 21 represent the simulation results for the work-shifts with two and
three analysts respectively. The total average analysis duration is decreased 3.88%
and 0.85% for the work-shifts with two and three analysts respectively. Moreover,
the waiting time is decreased 2.23% for the work-shifts with two analysts, and 2.15%
for the work-shifts with three analysts.
An observation from the simulation results of the work-shifts with two and three
analysts shows one important factor to improve the efficiency by the employed ap-
proach is about combination of the selected analysts’ expertise for one work-shift. If
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analysts with different expertise are chosen to work in the same work-shift, it would
increase the efficiency of the SOC by the proposed dispatching model more. For in-
stance, if we have two analysts that each one has a good performance result for a
different range of investigation types, the performance improvement is more than the
situation that we have three analysts with the same expertise level.
Parameters New Incidents Updated Incidents Closed Alerts Total Dataset
Number of investigations 24 57 1535 1616
Parameters Real Simu % Real Simu % Real Simu % Real Simu %
Total average analysis duration 15:17 15:31 +1.53% 05:11 03:37 30.22% 01:23 1:20 3.61% 01:43 01:39 3.88%
Waiting time 120:01 114:59 4.19% 120:27 115:40 3.97 % 120:01 117:54 1.76% 120:28 117:47 2.23%
Table 20: The alert dispatching method dataset statistics for 17-day work-shifts with
2 analysts, the simulation results and the reduction ratios (the sign “+” implies an
increase than the reduction)
Parameters New Incidents Updated Incidents Closed Alerts Total Dataset
Number of investigations 44 100 2125 2269
Parameters Real Simu % Real Simu % Real Simu % Real Simu %
Total average analysis duration 19:31 17:49 8.71% 05:22 04:49 10.25% 01:26 1:28 +2.32% 01:57 01:56 0.85%
Waiting time 120:25 116:02 3.64% 119:48 116:05 3.1% 119:58 117:29 2.07% 119:58 117:23 2.15%
Table 21: The alert dispatching method dataset statistics for 15-day work-shifts with
3 analysts, the simulation results and the reduction ratios (the sign “+” implies an
increase than the reduction)
Table 22 is the simulation results for one work-shift with 4 analysts. As is shown,
the total average analysis duration and the waiting time are decreased by 32.21% and
6.58% respectively. This experiment shows also the employed approach improves the
SOC performance where the number of analysts is increased and the analysts working
in the same work-shift have different expertise regarding different investigation types.
Parameters New Incidents Updated Incidents Closed Alerts Total Dataset
Number of investigations 7 6 147 160
Parameters Real Simu % Real Simu % Real Simu % Real Simu %
Total average analysis duration 19:55 11:34 41.92% 05:51 01:37 72.36% 01:31 1:13 19.78% 02:29 01:41 32.21%
Waiting time 120:06 119:33 0.45% 118:58 118:37 0.29% 119:54 115:29 3.68% 119:52 115:47 3.41%
Table 22: The alert dispatching method dataset statistics for 1-day work-shift with 4
analysts, the simulation results and the reduction ratios
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5.4 Case Study III, The Feedback Module
Our study on the analysts’ activity logs shows investigations’ average durations for
different attack types are usually different from each other. Different analysts’ aver-
age durations are usually also different even for the same attack type implying the
different efficiency. The different efficiency can be due to the analysts’ different levels
of knowledge regarding analysis approaches or familarity about clients’ environments.
As is discussed in Sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.4, one feature of the feedback module is
showing previous investigation logs whose alert type is similar with which the analyst
is currently analyzing. In this case study, we evaluate how such a feedback module
would affect the analysts’ performance.
We consider one analyst as the senior analyst who has better efficiency than
others. The other analysts who may benefit from the senior analyst’s knowledge and
experience are called junior analysts. We model the trend of investigation durations
of the senior analyst, and partially apply the model to future investigation durations
of the junior analysts, assuming that, since the junior analysts can see what the senior
analyst performed through the feedback module, they can potentially improve their
efficiency.
Linear regression analysis [58] is employed to model the senior analyst’s investi-
gation durations. By the regression analysis, the mathematical function representing
investigation durations is extracted from the dataset. The duration of each investi-
gation completed by the senior analyst is considered as a data point for that analyst.
Different data points of the analyst is ordered by time chronologically as they are
performed in different days. By extrapolating the established model, we can predict
future investigation durations of the senior analyst based on his historical data.
It is discussed in Section 2, several alert types (EventID) indicating the same
attack type are grouped together to form an investigation type. EventID can be the
signature of an exploited vulnerability of an application belonging to an attack type.
Since investigation types are general categories containing different kinds of EventIDs,
the feedback module will show the investigations of the same EventID to the analysts
by the feedback module.
In order to simulate a scenario, we choose an EventID with the highest number
of investigations in the dataset, since we would like to have sufficient investigation
samples (data points) to more accurately model the analyst’s investigation durations
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AnalystID Average Variance The Number of Investigations
1 16:05 - 1
2 01:17 - 1
3 21:34 717.72 2
4 05:46 100.57 5
5 07:29 35.45 6
6 03:16 7.85 45
Table 23: Different analysts’ statistics; the average investigation duration, the vari-
ance of investigations durations, and the number of investigations related to EventID
101010 which is a custom EventID for verifying DNS queries.
and assess the effect of our feedback module. The most common EventID is 101010
which has the largest number of investigations compared to other EventIDs. This
EventID is a custom EventID corresponding to sensors in verifying DNS queries.
Each DNS request is verified by comparing it to a blacklist in the SOC automatically.
If the requested domain is in the blacklist, the sensor raises an alert.
After determining the EventID, we must also choose a senior analyst to model
his investigation durations. Some parameters are considered in choosing the senior
analyst. The senior analyst is the one with the lower average investigation duration,
the lower data points variance, and the highest number of investigations related to the
selected EventID. In Table 23, we can see different analysts’ statistics regarding the
mentioned parameters. From the table, we can see the most suitable senior analyst is
the AnalystID 6 who has the lower average investigation duration, the lower variance,
and the higher number of conducted investigations compared to the other analysts.
We note that having more investigations by the AnalystID 6 in the dataset does
not mean other analysts pay less attention to EventID 101010. Since we have some gap
(missing days) in the dataset, it is likely that we may have missed some analysts’ work-
shifts, or AnalystID 6 simply has more work-shifts during the dataset’s particular
period.
A realistic assumption here is that the junior analyst will partially benefit from
the knowledge of the senior analyst by observing the latter’s investigation details but
such benefit is not likely sufficient to enable the former to perform those analyses
with exactly the same efficiency as the latter. In other words, the knowledge transfer
is partial instead of complete. Accordingly, we assign a percentage range by which a
junior analyst can improve the efficiency of his/her investigations of the same type
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after observing the senior analyst’s approach and results. It is assumed in this case
study that a junior analyst can gain 10% to 60% of the senior analyst’s knowledge
to improve his investigations. To obtain a more accurate estimation of such a range
from real data is a future work.
The average investigation duration of a junior analyst for EventID 101010 is con-
sidered as the default value for his future investigation durations in our simulation.
This default value can be improved by learning from the senior analyst. For example,
when we assume the junior analyst gains knowledge by 10%, his average investiga-
tion duration is calculated as the summation of 90% of the estimation proportion
(90% ∗ Junior Investigation Average) and 10% of the senior analyst’s investigation
duration (as predicted by the model) (10% ∗ Model Investigation Duration). As
another example, when we assume the junior analyst gains knowledge by 60%, his
average investigation duration is equal to 40% of his own duration plus 60% of the
senior analyst’s duration.
The reason behind considering the average investigation duration of the junior
analyst instead of modeling his investigations durations (as well as the senior analyst)
is that we do not have sufficient data points to establish the model for the junior
analysts. Since the dataset does not provide enough investigations for any single
EventID, the average investigation duration is considered for the junior analysts.
For the regression analysis, the X axis represents time series ordering investigations
chronologically and the Y axis is the investigation duration for the data points. In
practice investigations might be performed on the same day or across different days
in the period of the dataset, but the time distance between data points considered
in this case study is limited to one day in this simulation. We aim to obtain the
main trend of the investigation durations in chronological order as either an increase
or decrease in the average investigation durations of the senior analyst during the
dataset period.
There turn out to be a lot of fluctuations for the 45 data points representing
investigation durations for the AnalystID 6. To smooth the curve, every five adjacent
investigation durations are averaged and represents one data point. In the end, we
obtain a model of the senior analyst’s investigation durations as the exponential
equation shown below.
y = 2.8352e−0.005x (2)
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In Table 24, some of the data points are shown. The first 10 data points are
averaged investigation durations from 45 investigations of the dataset for the senior
analyst, and the next 10 data points are the extrapolation of the model. The aver-
age duration of the dataset data points is 3:04, where the average duration of the
extrapolated data points is 2:37 showing the decreasing trend of the senior analyst’s
model, which indicates that the analyst’s efficiency for this type of investigations
slowly improves over time.
X; Time Y; Investigation X; Future Y; Extrapolated
Series Duration Time Series Investigation Duration
1 2:11 11 2:41
2 2:20 12 2:40
3 2:11 13 2:40
4 5:57 14 2:38
5 3:31 15 2:38
6 2:32 16 2:37
7 1:59 17 2:36
8 2:54 18 2:35
9 5:46 19 2:35
10 1:16 20 2:34
Table 24: First 10 investigation durations represent data points from the dataset for
the senior AnalystID 6 and EventID 101010, and the next 10 investigation durations
are extrapolated under the model.
As is discussed, in order to estimate the junior analyst’s efficiency, a percentage
range of gaining knowledge is considered from 10% to 60%. We simulate 10 future
investigation durations for the junior analysts by combining their own investigation
average duration and the effect of the senior analysts knowledge using the percentage.
Table 25 shows the simulation results, where the junior analyst is AnalystID 5
with the default investigation average duration of 7:29. Estimation results show that,
if the junior AnalystID 5 gains 10% of the senior analyst’s knowledge through the
feedback module, the average investigation duration will change from 7:29 to 6:59,
decreased by 6.68%. If he/she gains 60% of the senior analyst’s knowledge, his/her
average investigation duration will change from 7:29 to 4:33, decreased by 39.2%.
Table 26 shows the simulation results where the junior analyst is AnalystID 4 with
the default average of 5:46. Simulation results show that, if the junior AnalystID 4
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Simulated Junior’s average Model’s investigation Simulated
Time Series investigation duration*90% duration*10% investigation duration
1 6:44 0:16 7:00
2 6:44 0:16 7:00
3 6:44 0:16 7:00
4 6:44 0:15 6:59
5 6:44 0:15 6:59
6 6:44 0:15 6:59
7 6:44 0:15 6:59
8 6:44 0:15 6:59
9 6:44 0:15 6:59
10 6:44 0:15 6:59
Simulated Junior’s average Model’s investigation Simulated
Time Series investigation duration*40% duration*60% investigation duration
1 2:59 1:37 4:36
2 2:59 1:36 4:35
3 2:59 1:36 4:35
4 2:59 1:35 4:34
5 2:59 1:35 4:34
6 2:59 1:34 4:33
7 2:59 1:34 4:33
8 2:59 1:33 4:32
9 2:59 1:33 4:32
10 2:59 1:33 4:32
Table 25: The simulation results of the feedback module’s impact for the junior An-
alystID 5 with the default average investigation duration of 7:29 for the EventID
101010. The first part simulates the junior’s efficiency for 10 future investigations
by considering the knowledge transfer percentage as 10%, and the second part simu-
lates the junior’s efficiency for 10 future investigations by considering the knowledge
transfer percentage as 60%.
gains 10% of the senior analyst’s knowledge, the average investigation duration will
change from 5:46 to 5:26, decreased by 5.78%. If he/she gains 60% of the senior
analyst’s knowledge, his/her average investigation duration will change from 5:46 to
3:53, decreased by 32.66%.
In summary, in this case study, the impact of showing previous investigations
to the analysts, which is one of the important features of the feedback module, is
assessed based on some assumptions. The AnalystID 6 is considered as a senior
analyst, and AnalystsIDs 5 and 4 are juniors. Based on the simulation results, if
the junior analysts gain 10% to 60% of the professional analyst’s knowledge; the
efficiency of AnalystID 5 can be improved by 6.68% to 39.2%, and the efficiency of
AnalystID 4 can be improved by 5.78% to 32.66%. Those results clearly demonstrate
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Simulated Junior’s average Model’s investigation Simulated
Time Series investigation duration*90% duration*10% investigation duration
1 5:11 0:16 5:27
2 5:11 0:16 5:27
3 5:11 0:16 5:27
4 5:11 0:16 5:27
5 5:11 0:16 5:27
6 5:11 0:16 5:27
7 5:11 0:16 5:27
8 5:11 0:15 5:26
9 5:11 0:15 5:26
10 5:11 0:15 5:26
Simulated Junior’s average Model’s investigation Simulated
Time Series investigation duration*40% duration*60% investigation duration
1 2:18 1:37 3:55
2 2:18 1:36 3:54
3 2:18 1:36 3:54
4 2:18 1:35 3:53
5 2:18 1:35 3:53
6 2:18 1:34 3:52
7 2:18 1:34 3:52
8 2:18 1:33 3:51
9 2:18 1:33 3:51
10 2:18 1:32 3:50
Table 26: The simulation results of the feedback module’s impact for the junior An-
alystID 4 with the default average investigation duration of 5:46 for the EventID
101010. The first part simulates the junior’s efficiency for future 10 investigations
by considering the knowledge transfer percentage as 10%, and the second part simu-
lates the junior’s efficiency for future 10 investigations by considering the knowledge
transfer percentage as 60%.
the potential benefit of the feedback module of our tool. The summary of results is
shown in Table 27.
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Junior Default Investigation Estimation Reduction
AnalystID Average Duration 10% - 60% 10% - 60%
5 7:29 6:59 4:33 6.68% 39.2%
4 5:46 5:26 3:53 5.78% 32.66%




Related work is categorized into three different groups. Section 6.1 reviews existing
works regarding Managed Security Services (MSS), Managed Security Monitoring
(MSM), Network Security Monitoring (NSM), and Security Operation Center (SOC).
Those range from preliminary works on this emerging service to its different aspects,
such as design, classification, information sharing, etc.
In section 6.2, alert correlation techniques are reviewed, which draws a lot of
attention in academia and industry. It plays an important role to generate accurate
suspicious events for the security services. Moreover, alert correlation is a tangible
aspect of the SOC that can be improved. It has also led to other research areas either
military or non-military intelligent systems.
Section 6.3 reviews studies about Call Centers (CC), since SOC and CC are similar
regarding their performance evaluation. Existing works in this domain focus on dif-
ferent queueing models and methods to solve the problem of staffing and scheduling.
It also provides background knowledge for the alert dispatching simulation scenario.
6.1 MSS, MSM, NSM, SOC
Managed Security Monitoring (MSM) and Network Security Monitoring (NSM) were
the terms for a new generation of Managed Security Services (MSS). At the present
time, those three terms point to the same concept.
In the work of Allen et al. [1], different security services are reviewed, from
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network boundary protection services, vulnerability assessment and penetration test-
ing, anti-virus and content filtering services, information security risk assessments,
data archiving and restoration, on-site consulting to security monitoring and incident
management. Different guidelines about MSS request proposal, evaluating an MSS
proposal, MSS service level agreement, and transitioning to MSS are discussed in
details.
Managed Security Monitoring (MSM) is introduced as a network security solution
of this century by Schneier in the year 2000 [59]. He claims simply installing firewalls
and other security-related tools cannot tackle intrusions. MSM is compared with
Managed Security Services (MSS) in 2001 [60]. Where MSS is more about providing
updated firewalls, IDSs, and other security products for companies, MSM is moni-
toring a client’s network to recognize and respond to threats simultaneously in real
time.
NSM is defined for the first time by Bejtlich in [2] as “the collection, analysis, and
escalation of indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions.” The book
describes different terms and security processes beside deployment considerations. It
also explains a case study as an “intrusion reference model”. Moreover, the different
types of data needed to be collected from network are discussed beside useful open
source tools for NSM, such as traffic modifying tools. The book provides technical
best practices regarding event handling and incident response processes. It also allows
analysts and supervisors to learn weapons and tactics, telecommunication, system
administration, scripting and programming, and management and policy. 16 different
case studies are provided to show analysts how they can employ principles to intrusion
scenarios. And it discusses attacker’s perspective by describing attacking approaches
to products, processes, and people.
Implementing Network Security Monitoring (NSM) for cloud services is discussed
by Shin and Gu [5]. The CloudWatcher framework is proposed to direct network
packets of the cloud passing through defined network security monitoring points.
Another work in NSM area focuses on routing network traffic to monitoring devices
by introducing a system called OpenSAFE [8]. OpenSAFE provides configurable
network traffic routing by employing OpenFlow-supported devices [61] to preserve
high line rates performance, and introduces ALARMS as a flow specification language
to ease the management of network monitoring devices.
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Main concepts and components of a SOC as a heart of NSM are discussed in [3]
by Renaud Bidou for the first time in 2005. Different modules’ functionalities, from
event generating, collecting, and storing to analysis approaches and related response
methods, are covered to explain the process of building a SOC, where integrating all
modules is considered as a challenge. Other work [4] on designing a SOC proposes a
solution utilizing recognition mechanism of immune system to detect intrusions. The
SOC is designed in a way that it detects the self from non-self. The protected network
is preserved among immune cells.
Hu and Xie [7] present a novel design for a SOC by applying Dempster-Shafer
Theory (DST) on the basic SOC model proposed by Renaud Bidou [3]. By using
multi sensor data fusion techniques, they claim the presented approach reduces the
rate of both false positive and false negative alerts. The authors believe integrating
security services from a SOC is more beneficial since SOCs correlate different sources’
events to detect threats with higher accuracy compared to single sensor events.
A recent work [6] on designing SOCs by Li et al. proposes a hierarchical mobile-
agent-based SOC to avoid one fixed location for alert correlating and improve compu-
tational efficiency. Event collectors and correlators are distributed in the monitored
network to prevent single point of failure attacks resulting in downing of the service.
Since independent SOCs usually are reluctant to share security information about
new incidents, a study [62] introduces a mechanism for trusted sharing of security
incidents information among SOCs by minimum information sharing. Information,
such as time of occurrence, origin of attack, consequence, severity, and path of attack
can be shared in Security Incident Data Exchang (SIDEx) format by not revealing
sensitive information.
Ganame et al. [9] develops a SOC providing a global view of the monitored
network in a graphical way to help analysts detecting attacks. Different reports are
made from the aggregated alerts from different sources. Performance evaluation of
the proposed system is evaluated and compared with simple IDS. This is different
from our work since we evaluate analysis process performance performed by human
security analysts.
Another work [10] proposes a classification model to assess SOC services. By the
proposed framework, either SOC clients or owners can measure the maturity of SOC
processes regarding certain aspects, such as log collection, log retention and archival,
63
log analysis, monitoring of security environments for security events, diversity of
devices integrated, event correlation and workflow, incident management, reaction to
threats, threat identification, and reporting.
Sundaramurthy et al. [11] study three different operational SOCs to understand
their functionalities in details by the anthropological approach. Three different stu-
dents with computer science background are assigned as analysts in each SOC, and
trained to observe SOC analysts’ tasks. List of different aspects of each SOC is de-
tailed in this work, such as team structure, training methodology for new analysts,
operational workflows, employed tools and software, work-shifts scheduling, SOC ef-
ficiency metrics. They mention one performance metric considered in one of the
operational SOCs is the number of analyzed incidents per analyst daily. It is also de-
scribed that counting the number of incidents solely is not a good metric, if the time
duration of analysis is not considered. Consequently, efforts on difficult investigations
taking more time to analyze reduce the total number of analyzed incidents. As a re-
sult, analysts are not motivated to analyze deeply, since it results in showing lower
productivity for them in a managers’ point of view. In a university SOC assessed by
the same work [11], a ticketing system dispatching alert tickets to analysts, provides
a performance metric as time spent on each ticket. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no work presenting a clear approach to model SOC analysis process by human
analysts, and evaluating SOC performance by different metrics in the literature.
Michail studies SOC from business perspective in [12], and answers different ques-
tions about SOC, which vary from how SOCs can be different from each other with the
same goals to how being well-established helps a SOC to improve its performance.
The author claims comparing SOCs is not a valid question since they employ dif-
ferent security solutions, organizational structures, and services. However the same
high level goal is shared among them to protect against any cyber attack. The au-
thor also rejects the existence of any scientific literature supporting the idea that a
well-established SOC results in a better performance.
6.2 Alert Correlation Techniques
Every raw alert of an IDS can show a single attack step of an intrusion, however
usually it is a part of failed attack attempt or normal traffic. Consequently, SOCs
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mostly receive a huge amount of raw alerts from deployed sensors. Considering such
this massive load of raw alerts, two SOC-related studies [3], and [7] claim correlating
gathered events from different sensors plays an important role to generate accurate
suspicious events, and reduce the rate of false positive. There are plenty of works
for alert correlation, since it is considered as the most improvable and effective part
of a SOC regarding performance improvement. Data fusion techniques have been
employed earlier in other fields either military or non-military intelligent systems,
such as [63],[64].
In a recent survey on alert correlation by Leau et al. [65], correlation approaches
are classified to four categories, correlation methods based on similar semantics in
alerts description, predefined attack scenarios, preconditions and post conditions of
attacks, and data mining. First method targets different alerts’ attributes, such
as Source IP address, destination port number, etc. and correlates alerts by their
similarity score. Second method correlates alerts based on predefined attack scenarios.
Learning phase of this method can be user defined signatures from attack scenarios or
automatically extracted from training dataset. Third method correlates alerts based
on each attack scenario prerequisites and consequences. For the last two methods,
complexity of the design, and identifying new attacks are part of mentioned issues.
Fourth category is about methods employing data mining techniques to identify attack
patterns and correlations.
Elshoush and Osman [14] devise a correlation framework combining 10 compo-
nents, called normalization, pre-processing, prioritization, alert verification, alert fu-
sion, focus recognition, uncorrelated removal, multi-step correlation, intention recog-
nition, and impact analysis. This approach aims to reduce FP alerts in initial phases
by removing unrelated alerts from fused alerts. Then, it attempts to employ correla-
tion approaches, such as attack scenarios, to have correlated alerts.
Wang et al. [13] propose a memory efficient correlation approach by employing
attack graphs which are predefined attack scenarios. By introducing a novel approach
Queue Graph (QG), nested loop based correlation is solved, and it is possible to match
alerts to related nodes of the attack graph. Zali et al. [15] presents a correlation
approach by pre-defining simple relations among minor attacks to identify attack
scenarios in real time. By benefiting from TVA model[13], they model relations
among minor attacks as pre and post conditions of each attack pattern in a new
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way. Then, the algorithm extracts attack scenarios in real time with polynomial time
complexity.
A correlation method is introduced by Zhu and Ghorbani [66] to recognize differ-
ent attack scenarios without experts’ knowledge background. Multilayer perceptron
(MLP) and support vector machine (SVM) are employed as neutral network ap-
proaches to evaluate correlation probability of each pair of alerts. Correlation prob-
ability estimation results are stored in Alert Correlation Matrix (ACM), and ACM
will be used to extract high level attack scenarios.
Ramaki et al. [16] presents a correlation framework to detect multi-step attack
scenarios in real time as an Early Warning System (EWS). An EWS aims to identify
hidden risky behaviour of a system which might expose the system to threats[67].
Statistical and stream mining (sequence analysis) techniques are employed to design
the correlation scheme. The correlation framework works in two modes, oﬄine and
online. In oﬄine mode, aggregated alert types, called hyper alerts, are checked by
an episode mining algorithm to find aggregation options for hyper alerts. Then, in
learning phase, it learns multi-step attack scenarios while it is constructing an off-line
attack tree from the processed dataset. In online mode, it constructs an attack tree
in real time with the learned knowledge.
6.3 Call Centers And Queuing Models
Performance evaluation of a SOC is similar to Call centers (CC) modeling. In both
SOC and CC, humans serve different clients with different service requests in a queue.
In the SOC, security analysts are the servers and incoming alerts are considered as
different service requests, whereas in the CC, operators respond to different calls. In
both cases, incoming service requests are coming in a queue and the service needs
to meet certain service level agreement (SLA) specified between clients and service
company.
Brown et al. [68] describe queueing-theoretic models for service systems where
the number of human servers, arrival rate of requests, serving time, and authorized
waiting time of requests in a queue are inputs of the queueing model, and outputs of
the model could be for example distribution of waiting time for service requests and
the fraction of requests not being handled within the authorized time. They present
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a basic common queueing model M/M/N system or Erlang-C [69] which considers
arrival rate based on Poisson process, exponentially distributed service time, and
servers and clients act independently. Limitations of the basic model include not
considering time-dependant parameters, clients’ or their requests heterogeneity, and
servers’ skill levels.
Green et al. [17] discuss different methods of queuing-theory for setting a service
system to serve clients whose request-pattern is predictable during a day (how much
demanding in which periods). Different aspects of service systems are discussed, such
as setting the system capacity (overall size of the workforce), single-skilled vs. multi-
skilled human servers, and queueing models which consider demanding periods beside
service time.
Excoffier et al. [18] try to solve staffing problem with a solution that determines
the minimum number of servers that could conform to SLA. The proposed solution
is based on linear approximation, and considered arrival rate as random. the other
similar work [19] presents a robust solution guaranteeing that the proposed shift
schedule with the minimum number of servers can conform to SLA. It computes the
solution by considering the probability distributions of uncertain parameters.
Other recent works on queueing models of call centers [20][70] mostly focus on
considering a new input parameter for queueing models called impatient customers.
This parameter indicates those customers abandoning the queue before being served.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude our work by summarizing the contributions and dis-
cussing the directions of future work.
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, by modeling the main workflow of an operational Security Operation
Center (SOC), a system for improving the SOC’s performance has been designed
consisting of four modules; monitoring, measuring, simulation, and feedback. The
first three modules empower the SOC managers to evaluate the current SOC perfor-
mance, and assess potential improvement options through simulations. The feedback
module enables knowledge transfer among SOC analysts in their ongoing workflows
to improve their performance.
By deploying a logging component inside the main SOC console, analysts’ activity
logs from a real production SOC are collected from June to August 2015 for 57 days
in a dataset for evaluating our system. Three case studies have been conducted based
on the dataset to study the designed system’s effectiveness, namely, modifying the
duration of steps, a different alert dispatching method, and the feedback module’s
impact. In the case study of modifying the duration of steps, we provide two im-
provement scenarios for the SOC workflow. The simulation result of the combined
scenarios demonstrates a performance improvement of 7.36%. In the case study of a
different alert dispatching method, the results indicate that one important factor to
improve the efficiency by the employed approach is about combination of the selected
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analysts’ expertise for one work-shift. If analysts with different expertise are chosen
to work in the same work-shift, it would increase the efficiency of the SOC by the
proposed dispatching model more. The simulation results for the 33-day work-shifts
state a 4.42% improvement in the average investigation duration and 2.18% in the
alerts waiting time. In the case study of the feedback module’s impact, knowledge
transfer rates (10% to 60%) are considered for two junior analysts gaining knowl-
edge from a senior analyst regarding a specific EventID. The average performance
improvement for the two junior analysts ranges from 6.23% to 35.93% depending on
their knowledge transfer rate. In order to asses the improvement results, it should be
considered that the all improvement percentages point at the time duration reduction
in one single investigation.
7.2 Future Work
We address our future work by two directions. We will employ data mining for auto-
mated analysis of investigations logs. The examples are employing classification and
association techniques. By classification, we can label analysts performance regard-
ing their performance evaluation. Association rules can be employed to find frequent
patterns, such as if one analyst has a certain habit in investigation, or if one EventID
is closed all the time for a client, it can be suggested to the SOC to filter it.
We will also apply and simulate some queuing theories on the dataset to show
how different models affect the overall performance of the SOC differently to find the
optimum approach.
Moreover, we would like to extend case studies on a larger scale dataset.
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